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Abstract  
 
The present study utilized multiple methods of detecting self-deception and other-deception 
and explored potential implications for organizations hiring individuals exhibiting these 
tendencies. Participants were 242 undergraduate business students who completed self-
ratings of extraversion and agreeableness under both “answer honestly” instructions and 
“answer as if you are applying for a job” instructions. Additionally, they completed the 
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement scales of the BIDR, the fake good 
scale and the good impression scale of the CPI, and took part in a role play with a trained 
observer. Individuals who knew the participants well provided ratings of participants’ 
adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, satisfaction with life, extraversion and 
agreeableness.  Results suggested that participants who had views of themselves that were 
closely aligned with the views of those who knew them well were rated as having higher 
levels of adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, and satisfaction with life. Measures of 
other-deception were positively related to levels of adjustment, integrity, and interpersonal 
skills while self-deception was associated with higher levels of interpersonal skills and lower 
levels of satisfaction with life. Future research is warranted to determine whether these 
results are observed in the applicant population.  
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Self-Deception and Other-deception in Personality Assessment: Detection and Implications 
Personality and job performance studies from the 1900s through the mid-1980s 
consisted primarily of researchers investigating the relationships of individual scales from a 
myriad of personality inventories to various aspects of job performance. Based on these 
studies, researchers concluded that there were no meaningful relationships between 
personality and job performance:  “There is not generalizable evidence that personality 
measures can be recommended as good or practical tools for employee selection” (Guion &  
Gottier, 1965 p. 159). 
 
However, the application of meta-analysis techniques and an emerging consensus 
regarding the Big Five structure of personality has increased the respect and usage of 
personality measures in both the research and the applied world. As a comparison, consider 
that in 1983 a study by the American Society of Personnel Administrators (ASPA, 1983) 
found that only 9% of organizations were using personality for external selection and only 
4% were using this type of testing for internal selection/promotion. In a more recent study, 
Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page (1999) found that 21-50% of organizations were utilizing 
personality testing. 
One meta-analysis was particularly instrumental in the growth of personality testing 
research and application (Barrick & Mount, 1991). The authors examined the relationship 
between the Big Five personality dimensions and various job performance criteria (i.e., job 
proficiency, training proficiency and personnel data) across five occupational groups (i.e., 
professionals, police, managers, sales, and skilled/semi-skilled).  They found that 
conscientiousness predicted performance ratings across jobs and settings (r = .20) and that 
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other Big Five characteristics were found to be predictive within certain occupational groups. 
For example, extraversion was found to be predictive of performance in sales jobs while 
extraversion and openness to experience were found to be valid predictors of training 
proficiency across occupations. Another meta-analysis (Tett, Jackson, & Rothenstein, 1991) 
found that when researchers choose personality tests on the basis of job analysis, conducted 
confirmatory analyses, and studied incumbents with reasonable job tenure, validity 
coefficients were even larger than those reported by Barrick and Mount (1991).  
Additionally, personality tests have found favor in both academia and industry as they exhibit 
little adverse impact (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Hough, 1998) and add incremental validity 
above and beyond ability measures (Salgado, 1998; Day & Silverman, 1989).  
However, personality tests are still not without critics. One frequently cited criticism 
is that applicants may be able to inflate their scores and may do so in order to increase their 
likelihood of obtaining a job (Hogan & Hogan, 1992). Numerous studies lend credence to 
this concern as research suggests that individuals can distort their scores when instructed to 
do so and that some distortion is actually occurring in applicant settings (e.g., Alliger & 
Dwight, 2000; Becker & Colquitt, 1992; Dalen, Stanton, & Roberts, 2001, Furnham, 1990; 
Furnham, 1997; Kluger & Collela, 1993; LoBello & Sims, 1993; Martin, Bowen, & Hunt, 
2002; Scandell & Wlazelek, 1996; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).  
To address concerns with response distortion, researchers have taken steps to assess 
the impact on validity. Most notably, researchers have focused on the impact of distortion on 
criterion-related validity and on the rank ordering of job candidates. However, the results of 
these studies have been mixed and offer no definitive conclusions about the impact of 
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distortion (e.g., Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Ones & Viswesvaran, 
1998; Topping & O’Gorman, 1997; Borkenuau & Amelang, 1985; Ruch & Ruch, 1967).  
 Examination of the research reveals that there are several areas of concern regarding 
the design of previous studies that may shed light on the conflicting results. One glaring issue 
is the lack of consistency in the terminology used across research methods.  For example, 
over time, the tendency to provide an inaccurate portrayal of the self came to be known as 
“faking”. However, the method of detecting this inaccuracy has varied widely. For example, 
some researchers use social desirability scales to detect an inaccurate portrayal while others 
use a directed faking study, and still others may compare applicant scores to incumbent 
scores. Although all of these methods likely have some merit, there is little evidence to 
suggest exactly what phenomena they are capturing. Furthermore, there are no research 
studies that are known to the author that examine whether these methodologies are capturing 
the same experience. As a result, it appears that researchers have put the proverbial “cart 
before the horse”, making it difficult (if not impossible) to examine the collective research 
data and draw reasonable conclusions.   
 In an effort to provide a clearer context for the interpretation of existing research and 
in an attempt to build a better foundation for future research, is necesssary to take a closer 
look at what phenomenon traditionally-used methodologies are capturing. Some researchers 
suggest that one promising framework for interpretation is the extent to which studies capture 
why distortion is occurring (e.g., Paulhus, 1984 ).  Two commonly cited reasons for the 
distortion are self-deception and other-deception. In the case of self-deception, individuals 
provide an overly positive view of themselves because they lack the self-sight necessary to 
provide a realistic self- description. On the other hand, individuals engaging in other-
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deception may be consciously distorting their scores in order to obtain a favorable outcome 
(i.e., in the selection process this would be the job). The evidence suggests that self-deception 
and other-deception are indeed distinct constructs (e.g., Robins & Paulhus, 2001) that have 
differing implications for organizations (e.g., Paulhus, 1986).   For example, self-deception 
has been linked to a variety of positive outcomes including adjustment: 
There is a large and replicated literature showing that well-adjusted people have 
positively biased self-images; consequently, well adjusted people tend to ignore 
minor criticisms, discount their failures, and avoid negative thoughts, and expect to 
succeed in most of their undertakings (Hogan, 1991 p. 905).  
 
This may be important to organizations as individuals having positive views of the self may 
be more likely to work harder and longer on tasks (e.g., Felson, 1984). In turn, this 
perseverance may lead to more effective performance and greater likelihood of achieving 
goals (e.g, Bandura, 1977; Baumesiter, Hamilton, & Trice, 1985).  
On the other hand, other-deception has been linked to the ability to effectively engage 
in self-presentation behaviors. That is, there is evidence to suggest that in some cases, self-
presentation behaviors may lead to deception (e.g., Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002). The 
ability to engage in self-presentation behaviors is frequently cited as being important in those 
jobs that involve much interpersonal interaction (e.g., salesperson, customer service agent).  
Recognizing that these two types of deception are important considerations, the 
present study will use these constructs as a framework for examining what some 
traditionally-used research methods are capturing. This research will include a simultaneous 
examination of a directed faking study, social desirability scales, and external criteria 
measures in an attempt to discern whether they capture self-deception and/or other-deception. 
This research makes significant practical and theoretical contributions to the literature. From 
a theoretical standpoint, it will be a good first step in examining what these multiple methods 
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are capturing, rather than, as previous research has done, making an assumption that all 
methods are measuring the same construct. As such, this study will provide a better context 
for interpretation of past research and a firmer foundation for future work. From a practical 
standpoint, the results of this study will give organizations a better understanding of what 
traditionally used methods are capturing. As a result, decision-makers can have a better 
context for interpretation of results and an understanding of which research methodologies 
will allow them to capture self-deception and/or other-deception.  
A closer look at self-deception and other-deception: Why is the differentiation important? 
In a selection context, the primary concern is that individuals will manipulate their 
scores in order to cast themselves in a more favorable light. Typically, one attempts to casts 
oneself in a positive light by answering affirmatively to socially sanctioned behaviors (e.g., I 
help out my coworkers when they need me) and negatively to behaviors that are not socially 
sanctioned (e.g., I manipulate others). This tendency is frequently termed socially desirable 
responding. More specifically, the former is often called attribution while the latter is termed 
denial (e.g., Paulhus, 1984). However, evidence suggests these are equivalent measures of 
the same construct (e.g., Ramanaih & Martin, 1980).   
One key area that is frequently overlooked in the discussion of this type of response 
distortion is that individuals may make these attributions and/or engage in this denial either at 
a conscious or unconscious level. That is, individuals may inaccurately perceive they possess 
the favorable traits or behaviors they report (or conversely they don’t possess the unfavorable 
traits or behaviors they deny). As such, they believe their self-reports to be accurate when 
they are actually inflated. In contrast, individuals who engage in other-deception realize they 
do not possess the favorable behavior or traits that they report but consciously distort their 
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responses in order to cast themselves in a more favorable light and thus, increase the 
likelihood of a favorable outcome. 
 It is important to make these distinctions for several reasons. First, research suggests 
that self-deception is consistent across situations, but other-deception is contextually bound 
(i.e., its presence and level are dependent on the situation under which the assessment occurs 
as well as the purpose of the assessment) (Paulhus, 1984; Gudjonsson, 1990). That is, 
depending upon the circumstances, individuals may choose to consciously distort responses 
to a self-report questionnaire in order to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome. 
However, across circumstances, an individual’s level of self-deception is expected to remain 
constant. Second, there may be differing outcomes for organizations according to the type of 
deception that is occurring. 
Self-deception 
 The first factor, self-deception, has been defined as the “process of giving positively 
biased responses to questionnaire items when the responses are not true but the respondent 
believes they are” (Paulhus, 1984, 1986) and has been found to be prevalent in personality 
testing (e.g., Lewinshon, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980). This finding is not surprising as 
research suggests that most people hold a very positive view of themselves (see Greenwald, 
1980 for review). The majority of individuals rate themselves as better than the average 
person in terms of traits (Brown, 1966) and abilities (e.g., Larwood & Whittaker, 1977; 
Campbell, 1986) and rate themselves more favorably on personality attributes than do 
outside observers (Lewinshohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980).   Furthermore, research 
suggests that most individuals process positive information about the self differently than 
negative information. For example, most people recall positive personality information more 
easily than negative personality information (e.g., Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Kuiper & 
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MacDonald, 1982; Kuiper, MacDonald, & Shaw, 1985) and information about success more 
easily than information regarding failure (Silverman, 1964).  
Traditional conceptualizations of mental health have been that psychologically 
healthy people were those who maintained a close contact with reality, including a realistic 
view of the self: 
An impartial and objective attitude toward oneself is held to be a primary virtue, basic to the 
development of all others. There is but a weak case for chronic self-deception with its 
crippling self-justifications and rationalizations that prevent adaptation and growth. And so 
may it be said that if any trait of personality is intrinsically desirable, it is the disposition and 
ability to see oneself in perspective (Allport, 1937; p. 422). 
 
This view has been shared by numerous researchers throughout the years (e.g., Vaillant, 
1977; Jourard & Landsman, 1980; Haan, 1977) but has been challenged in the recent 
literature. This challenge has come as a result of several studies that link the tendency to self-
enhance to a variety of positive outcomes including adjustment (Taylor & Brown, 1988), 
optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and a sense of general capability (Holden & Fekken, 
1989). Moreover, significant correlations have been reported between self-deception and 
good mental health (Linden, Paulhus, & Dobsen, 1986) and self-esteem (Paulhus & Reid, 
1991).  
Additionally, research suggests that self-deception plays a role not only in one’s 
perception of the present self, but also in the perception of the past and future selves (e.g., 
Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1989; Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg; 1989).  One reason this 
finding is important is because there is evidence to suggest that those who expect positive 
outcomes are more likely to set higher goals for themselves.  Furthermore, they are more 
likely to pursue those goals more vigorously even in the face of setbacks (Bandura, 1989). 
Similarly, Taylor and Brown (1988), in an integration of the literature, conclude that self-
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deception promotes psychological adjustment as well as “higher motivation, greater 
persistence, more effective performance, and ultimately, greater success” (p. 199). In an 
organizational setting, it is likely these considerations translate into higher levels of job 
performance. 
On the flipside, lack of self-deceptive positivity about one’s future has been linked to 
negative outcomes such as depression (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). 
Evidence also suggests that those individuals who have a more balanced view of themselves 
have low self-esteem and/or are moderately depressed (e.g., Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). These 
individuals offer self-appraisals that are more consistent with appraisals by objective 
observers (e.g., Lewinsohn, Mischel, & Barton, 1980) and with evaluations by known others 
(e.g., Brown, 1986). In turn, low self-esteem and depression have been linked to decreased 
levels of job performance (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2003; Druss, Schlesinger, & Allen, 2001).  
Despite the positive aspects of self-deception, there is also evidence that not all 
outcomes of self-deception are beneficial. For example, an enhanced version of the self may 
lead individuals to be closed to outside information that threatens their positive self-image. In 
turn, this may impede their development and learning. Research indicates that this is indeed 
occurring. For example, one study found that inflated self-perceptions could not be changed 
even when confronted with videotaped performance of a task (Robins & John, 1997). 
Furthermore, individuals engaging in self-deception have been found to make slow progress 
in the early stages of a training program (Lee & Klein, 2002).  
An additional concern is that self-enhancers may have problems building and 
maintaining interpersonal relationships. For example, receiving feedback inconsistent with 
one’s self-image may make these individuals hostile toward their evaluators. Within an 
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organizational context, this might translate into poorer working relationships between 
supervisors and subordinates. A longitudinal study found that self-enhancement had long-
term negative implications for interpersonal relationships outside of work (Colvin, Block, & 
Funder, 1995). That is, men who self-enhanced were described by their friends as being 
“condescending in relations with others” and “having hostilities toward others”. In contrast, 
men who did not self-enhance were described as “sympathetic and considerate”, “having a 
clear-cut and consistent personality”, and as “having a giving way with others”. Female self-
enhancers were described as having “hostility toward others”, “self-defeating”, and having a 
“brittle ego defense system”. Women who did not self-enhance were described by their 
friends as being “liked and accepted by people”, “cheerful”, and “having social poise and 
presence”.  
Other-deception 
For the purpose of the present study, other-deception will refer to consciously 
portraying oneself in a manner that is inconsistent with one’s perception of “true self”. 
Typically, individuals engage in this other-deception in order to gain a desirable outcome 
(e.g., in the case of selection the desirable outcome would be a job).  Other-deception is one 
type of self-focused impression management (also called self-presentation) tactic. 
Impression management has been referred to as “a creative process in which actors 
mold their outward behavior while taking into careful consideration the specific context and 
the target audience” (Goffman, 1959). Research suggests that individuals engage in a variety 
of impression management tactics when going through a selection process including both 
self-focused and other-focused behaviors. This terminology is not to be confused with self-
deception and other-deception. As the term suggests, self-focused impression management 
tactics include those behaviors that draw attention to the participant’s positive attributes 
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and/or accomplishments (e.g., self-promotion, entitlements) while other-focused tactics refer 
to those tactics that focus on the person they are trying to impress (e.g., ingratiation, flattery). 
The present study will focus on personality testing (not an area where the participant interacts 
with another individual), a context in which the concentration will be solely on self-focused 
impression management tactics.  
Although the present study examines deliberate, other-deception, it is still helpful to 
have a general understanding of research surrounding impression management as it provides 
a context in which deliberate, other-deception may occur. Research suggests that impression 
management techniques occur in a variety of human resource activities including interviews, 
performance appraisals, and training.  For example, in the interview, it has been found that 
applicant’s impression management techniques influence interviewer decisions, independent 
of applicant qualifications (Gilmore & Ferris, 1989). Another study found that job applicants 
employing self-focused impression management tactics received higher ratings, more 
recommendations for a job offer, and fewer rejections than applicants using other-focused 
impression management tactics (Delery & Kacmer, 1998).   In a longitudinal study, it was 
found that individuals who engaged in impression management behaviors (both self-focused 
and other-focused) influenced supervisory ratings of performance through perceived 
similarity and liking (Wayne & Liden, 1995). Furthermore, it has been found that individuals 
set higher goals on a new task when it is observed by someone than when it is not (Ferris & 
Porac, 1984). The authors interpret this behavior as a strategic form of self-focused 
impression management.   
Some researchers suggest that these impression management behaviors should not be 
factored out of the human resource decisions and activities as they represent trait-related 
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variance that is applicable to job performance. Specifically, it has been suggested that the 
ability to engage in these self-presentation behaviors or impression manage may be important 
in those jobs that involve much interpersonal interaction. That is, awareness of social norms 
and expectations and the ability to present oneself in a manner appropriate to the demands of 
the situation may be quite functional (suggested by Rosse, Stecher, Miller & Levin, 1998). 
However, the studies examining the link between deception and job performance have failed 
to adequately distinguish between self-deception and other-deception (e.g., Viswesvaran, 
Ones & Hough, 2001). 
Similarly to self-deception, not all consequences of engaging in this type of behavior 
are positive.  For example, impression management behaviors are viewed as negative when 
the actions are seen as incongruent with an observer’s view of situationally appropriate 
behavior. When this occurs, undesirable attributions and affective reactions are likely (e.g., 
Ferris, Judge, et al.; 1994 Gardner & Martinko, 1988). Furthermore, although self-promotion 
may lead others to give positive evaluations of the actor’s ability, it may create the 
impression that the actor is manipulative (e.g., Gurevitch, 1984).  
Moreover, research supports the supposition that self-presentation strategies do, in 
fact, in some situations lead to deception or the presentation of clearly false information. For 
example, one laboratory study examined dyadic interactions in which the participant was told 
to either appear likeable, competent, or told to simply get to know his/her partner (Feldman, 
Forrest, & Happ, 2002). After a ten-minute conversation, participants were asked to review a 
videotape of the process and identify the instances in which they deceived their partners. The 
authors then coded the lies into lie content (i.e., feelings, achievement, actions & plans, 
explanations, and facts), rationale for the lies (i.e., self-oriented or other-oriented) and type of 
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lie (outright, exaggerations, or subtle). The authors examined the differences observed. 
Overall, it was found that those individuals assigned to either the competent or likable 
conditions told more lies than those in the control condition (i.e., get to know your partner). 
As hypothesized, self-presentation goals were related to the content, type of lie, and rationale 
for the lie being told. Specifically, people in the competent condition told more self-oriented 
lies and more lies about plans and achievements. People in the likeable condition told more 
outright lies and exaggeration and more lies about feelings. Similarly, another study (Kashy 
& DePaulo, 1996) found that people who told more lies were more concerned with self-
presentation than those who told fewer lies. Another study utilized the Good Impression (GI) 
scale of the GPI as a measure of deliberate other-deception. No evidence was found for a 
relationship between other-deception and job performance for either executives or managers 
(Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001). Clearly, these findings are applicable to selection 
studies where applicants are presumably quite motivated to provide a positive self-
presentation.  
 People also report being overtly dishonest during the selection process. For example, 
in one study (McDaniel, Douglas, & Snell, 1997), a group of applicants who had recently 
posted their resumes on the World Wide Web were asked to report what faking behaviors 
they engaged in during the application process. Of the applicants, 42% reported giving false 
opinions, one-third stated they had exaggerated their work experience, and one quarter 
admitted to such behaviors as inflating their pay rates, denying being fired from a previous 
job, and presenting themselves as more agreeable than they actually are. People also report 
using non-existent equipment. For example, one study of electrician applicants found that 
35% reported using a piece of equipment that did not exist (Pannone, 1984). Another study 
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(Anderson & Warner, 1984) found that 45% of applicants for state jobs indicated that in the 
past they had observed or performed a nonexistent task.  
These results suggest that self-deceptors, other-deceptors, and those who do not 
engage in deception may possess different underlying characteristics that have important 
implications for job performance. According to the research, there are both positive and 
negative implications for organizations hiring people possessing these tendencies. As such, it 
is important that organizations recognize what types of deception that occur in selection 
settings and potential implications for job performance.  
However, complicating matters further, as the following literature review reveals, 
there are no definitive answers regarding what type of deception any single methodology 
captures.  Therefore, it becomes necessary to take a more holistic approach to examining 
applicant deception. The present study will take such an approach by simultaneously using 
several methodologies (i.e., within-subjects, two social desirability scales, and observations 
from others) in an attempt to understand how the use of multiple tactics may allow us to 
identify patterns in the data that will enable us to more accurately identify self-deceptors, 
other-deceptors, and non-deceptors. Based on the findings of previous research, a “self-
deception profile”, “other-deception profile”,  “no deception profile”, and “mixed deception 
profile” will be created. That is, profiles will be designed that reflect how individuals who 
are primarily “self-deceptors”, “other-deceptors”, “non-deceptors”, and “mixed deceptors” 
would be expected to perform in directed faking studies, on social desirability scales, and 
how their self-ratings would compare to outside raters.  Following participant assignment to 
these categories, outcome data will be examined in order to determine whether the expected 
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pattern of results emerges in terms of each participant’s adjustment, well-being, integrity, and 
interpersonal skills. 
Methods for Examining Deception 
Directed Faking Studies 
One method frequently used to examine deception (and a method that will be used in 
the current study) is a “directed faking” study. This methodology typically involves 
participants in either a laboratory or applied setting who are given a personality test under 
differing instructional sets. A common within-subjects methodology includes two conditions: 
one condition in which applicants are told to ‘answer honestly’ and another condition in 
which the same individuals are given some variant of ‘fake good’ instructions (e.g., fake 
good, answer if you are applying for a job, answer as if you are applying for a specific job, 
etc.). The difference scores obtained for each individual are then computed. These difference 
scores are sometimes interpreted as conscious score inflation or other-deception.  
A between-subjects version of this methodology is also quite common. That is, 
control group participants are given answer honestly instructions and experimental group 
participants are given some variant of ‘fake good’ instructions. Next, the responses between 
the groups are compared and differences are interpreted as score inflation. These between-
subject and within-subject studies frequently do not explicitly make the differentiation 
between self and other-deception. Although the author is not aware of any studies explicitly 
examining this assumption, given that there is random assignment to groups, it could be 
argued that self-deception would be constant across groups and therefore other-deception 
would be the measurement captured. 
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The Big Five personality traits (i.e., openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, extraversion and neuroticism) are often the focus of between-subjects studies. 
The majority of studies involving the Big Five using this methodology have demonstrated 
that individuals are able to inflate their scores when instructed to do so (e.g., Furnham, 1997; 
Scandell & Wlazelek, 1996). However, there have been some discrepancies as to which of 
the Big Five variables are most susceptible to impression management. For example, one 
study found that individuals were only able to significantly alter their scores to appear to be 
more conscientious, more agreeable, and less neurotic (Furnham, 1997).  However, a recent 
meta-analysis (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) combined the results of 51 studies that examined 
Big Five score inflation and found that all Big Five characteristics were equally susceptible 
to score inflation. Additionally, the authors found that if instructed to “fake good” 
respondents in within-subjects designs were able to raise their scores by approximately .75 
standard deviations and in between-subjects designs by approximately .50 standard 
deviations. The authors also found that within-subject designs produced larger effect sizes 
and greater variability across the Big Five factors than between-subjects designs.  
Similarly, research utilizing this methodology suggests that individuals can 
significantly alter their scores on both overt and covert integrity tests (It should be noted that 
some measures of the Big Five may be included in the covert integrity tests—especially 
measures of conscientiousness). A meta-analysis of 14 studies (thirteen student samples and 
one prisoner sample) found that overt integrity tests (i.e., those tests that ‘judge the likelihood 
of counterproductive behavior based on responses to questions designed to measures 
thoughts, feelings, and expected behaviors involving honesty and punishment and deviance 
as well as admissions of past misbehavior’) found that individuals could raise their scores by 
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approximately one standard deviation when instructed to “fake good” and by one and a half 
standard deviations when coached about how to respond to the inventory (Alliger & Dwight, 
2000). It was also found that individuals who were asked to “fake good” on a personality-
based integrity test could raise their scores by as much as one-half of a deviation.  
Personality tests and integrity tests are not the only selection tools that have been 
examined using this research design. Numerous studies have found that individuals are able 
to inflate their scores on biodata instruments when instructed to do so (e.g., Becker & 
Colquitt, 1992; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Kluger, Reilly, & Russell, 1991). One study found 
that the items that were more objective and verifiable were less amenable to score inflation 
(Becker and Colquitt, 1992). As mentioned previously, several interesting studies have been 
conducted in which applicants were asked for very concrete and verifiable background 
information and yet they flagrantly misrepresented themselves (e.g. Pannone, 1984; 
Anderson, Wagner & Spencer, 1984).  
To the author’s knowledge, the assumption that directed faking studies capture 
deliberate, other-deception has not been empirically tested. However, given that the design of 
the study generally consists of a comparison of scores obtained in two different scenarios, 
one in which individuals presumably have motivation to portray a specific image (i.e., 
answer as if applying for a job) and the other situation in which they do not (i.e., answer 
honestly), it is a reasonable hypothesis that the design captures other-deception. As such, the 
present study will hypothesize and test whether directed faking studies are able to capture 
other-deception.  
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Social Desirability Scales 
 Another method that will be used to detect deception in the present study is the use 
of social desirability scales. This method is both common and highly controversial. Social 
desirability scales are included in most commercially available measures of personality 
(Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001) and typically contain items that are either socially 
desirable but unlikely to be true (e.g., “Before voting I thoroughly investigate the 
qualifications of all candidates”) or socially undesirable items that are likely to be true (e.g., I 
like to gossip at times”) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The scores on these scales are 
commonly used to correct the inventory for the effects of social desirability or to disqualify 
applicants from the selection process. 
 Social desirability scales are popular as they are typically inexpensive, easy to 
administer, and add little time to the test administration. However, evidence suggests these 
scales do not differentiate self-deception and other-deception and bear little relationship to 
one another, further suggesting they are measuring different constructs (e.g., Paulhus, 1991).   
This is problematic as most social desirability scales are purported to measure “other-
deception” and are typically interpreted within that context. As such, within some practical 
settings, individuals who surpass a cut-off score on a social desirability scale are deemed 
“fakers” and disqualified from the selection process, when in fact, they may actually believe 
their responses to be honest portrayals of the self.   
Another concern is that social desirability scales frequently exhibit relationships with 
the observed personality scales of interest (e.g., Furnham, 1986; Messick, 1960) and there is 
little agreement regarding the interpretation of this covariation. Some researchers interpret 
this relationship as an indication of contaminated scales scores (e.g., Holden & Fekken, 
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1989) while others claim the overlap reflects true overlap between the personality traits of 
interest and the social desirability scales (e.g., Nicholson & Hogan, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 
1983, Smith & Ellingson, 2002). The results of one meta-analysis (Ones, Viswesvaran, & 
Reiss, 1996) support the latter by suggesting estimated population correlations of .18 and .13 
for the relationship between social desirability and emotional stability and conscientiousness, 
respectively. Studies utilizing a clear distinction between self-deception and other-deception 
may shed some light on this area of disagreement.   
 There has been some progress in creating instruments that differentiate self-
deception from other-deception. One such instrument that has shown promise is Paulhus’ 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). Based on earlier work by Sackeim and 
Gur (1979), this instrument was specifically designed to capture self-deception and other-
deception as independent constructs by using the Impression Management scale (IM) and 
Self-deceptive Enhancement scale (SDE). When completing the IM scale, respondents are 
asked to rate the degree to which they typically perform socially desirable, but uncommon 
behaviors (e.g., I always obey the laws even if I am unlikely to get caught). In contrast, when 
completing the SDE scale, respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement to items that 
reflect a lack of self-insight (e.g., I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit).  
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the BIDR does differentiate between these 
two independent constructs. One manner in which validity was examined was through the 
examination of scale correlates to personality variables.  In one study, Paulhus, Reid, and 
Delognis (unpublished) found that SDE, but not IM, correlated with optimism.  Furthermore, 
another study found that SDE and IM exhibited different relationships with the Big Five. 
Specifically, the primary correlates of SDE were high extraversion and low neuroticism 
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while IM was associated with agreeableness and conscientiousness (Paulhus, 1998). Those 
high in SDE were also found to have high self-esteem, low neuroticism, depression, empathic 
distress, and social anxiety (Paulhus & Reid, 1991).  
Researchers have used the BIDR to further explore the relationship between 
commonly used social desirability scales, self-deception and other-deception and have found 
varied relationships. For example, one study used the BIDR to determine the relationships 
between response distortion, the NEO’s Positive Presentation Management (PPRM) scale, 
and self-deception and other-deception (Reid-Seiser & Fritzsche, 2001). Initial validation 
work on the PPRM suggested that the authors intended it to capture deliberate other-
deception. However, the findings of the study using the BIDR indicated that Paulhus’ 
measure of self-deceptive enhancement was most closely related to the PPRM.   Another 
study (Paulhus, 1991) found that the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, loaded on 
both self-deception and other-deception (although a little more so on other-deception) 
whereas the Edwards Social Desirability scale loaded primarily on the self-deception factor. 
In contrast, the Wiggins SD scale, and the CPI GI scale and Eysenck’s lie scale load 
primarily on other-deception. No research has directly compared these social desirability 
scale scores to other methods of assessing self-deception and other-deception. Clearly, many 
social desirability scales are failing to differentiate between self-deception and other-
deception. However, two scales that can be reasonably deemed to be capturing other-
deception are the GI scale and the fake good scale of the CPI. In order to understand why it is 
reasonable to make this assumption, it is necessary to understand the manner in which they 
were developed. The GI scale was constructed using an approach in which participants 
completed an experimental booklet of items under normal circumstances and then under 
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instructions to rate themselves so that they presented a very favorable self-portrait (i.e., such 
as if they were applying for a desirable job or in any situation in which they wanted to be 
judged as admirable or praiseworthy). The authors then compared the results of these two 
protocols and identified those items that changed significantly in terms of the reported degree 
of endorsement. Forty items that changed significantly were identified and retained for 
inclusion in the scale. The fake good scale was derived similarly to the GI. That is, the 
authors administered protocols under both “fake good” and “answer honestly” instructions. 
Then, an equation was derived as it best separated the experimentally produced protocols 
from the normative protocols. Given the method in which these two equations were 
developed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they capture other-deception.  
The present study will include four scales: the good impression scale, fake good 
scale, and the SDE and IM scales of the BIDR. The BIDR scales of IM and SDE are 
hypothesized to capture other-deception and self-deception, respectively. The GI scale and 
fake good scale are hypothesized to capture other-deception.  By using all of these scales, it 
is expected that it can be ascertained which scales are capable of capturing which type of 
deception.  
External Criteria Measures 
Another method used for detecting invalid protocols is external criteria measures.  
Two types of criteria are typically used: an objective operational criterion or a social 
judgment criterion. Examples of operational criteria are: talkativeness defined by counting 
the number of words one speaks in a conversation or sales ability defined by number of units 
sold (Paulhus & Robins, 2001). The most obvious advantage to this approach is its 
objectivity. However, on the downside, it is not always possible to find an objective criterion 
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that will cover all domains of the construct of interest. Furthermore, in some cases, there are 
simply no objective criteria available (Paulhus & Robins, 2001). Unfortunately, this is 
generally the case in the measurement of personality. As a result, it’s often necessary to use 
some sort of social judgment criterion in order to have a measure on which to compare the 
self-report measure of personality. Several types of social judgment criteria are frequently 
used including (but not limited to): (a) informed observers and (b) trained raters. In an effort 
to balance the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, both of these methods will be used 
in the present study.  
   Preferably, informed observers are those individuals who have had frequent and 
prolonged contact with the target individual (e.g., friends, significant others, parents, peers, 
children) and therefore have numerous observations of behavior across a variety of 
naturalistic settings. Research suggests that informed observer ratings can add incremental 
validity to self-report measures, perhaps because outside observers can offer a more realistic 
view of the target individual. For example, Mount, Barrick, and Strauss (1994) found that 
outside ratings of personality by supervisors, coworkers, and customers added incremental 
validity to self-report measures in the prediction of performance ratings.   
Despite the advantages of using informed raters, one frequently cited criticism is that 
these observers are typically poorly equipped to rate others and may be more likely to fall 
prey to common rater biases such as leniency bias and halo effect. Furthermore, they may 
typically only see the target individual within a small domain of their full behavior (e.g., a 
supervisor only seeing the behavior exhibited at work). In an effort to circumvent these 
biases, these ratings will be used in conjunction with ratings provided by trained observers. 
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In the present study, trained raters will engage participants in a scripted interaction. 
Throughout the interaction, the rater will systematically collect and record information and 
then make ratings based on this information. There are two main advantages to using this 
approach. The first advantage is uniformity. All target individuals are observed in the same 
controlled environment. The second advantage is that the same trained raters are used to 
make ratings. As such, there is consistency across ratings and less likelihood of the 
occurrence of common biases. On the downside, these are not ratings obtained in a 
naturalistic setting.  However, as previously mentioned, these ratings, combined with 
information obtained from informed observers should provide insight into some aspect of 
social reality. 
Developing Categories 
 Based on these research findings, it is possible to hypothesize a data pattern for the 
different types of deception.  The following describes the expected pattern of outcomes for 
those expected to be self-deceptors (i.e., those engaging primarily in self-deception), other-
deceptors (i.e., those engaging primarily in other-deception), non-deceptors (i.e., those who 
are not engaging in any type of deception), and a mixed category (i.e., those who score high 
in both self-deception and other-deception):  
Category 1: Self-deceptor. Self-deceptors will be identified through the use of social 
desirability scales, a directed faking study, and comparisons of self-report data to ratings 
made by trained raters and outside observers. One social desirability scale that will be used to 
identify self-deceptors will be the SDE scale of the BIDR (i.e., those individuals who answer 
affirmatively to 7 of the items on the SDE scale).  The other social desirability scales that 
will be used are the GI scale and the fake-good scale of the CPI. As previously discussed, 
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these scales are purported to capture only other-deception (given that they were developed 
using a “directed faking” approach), self-deceptors will not surpass the threshold scores on 
each of these scales. Based on previous research, it is also expected that self-deception will 
remain constant across situations while other-deception is contextually bound.  Therefore, it 
is expected that in a directed faking study, personality scores of self-deceptors will remain 
constant from Time 1 (i.e., answer honestly) to Time 2 (i.e., answer as if you are applying for 
a job). In this study, the personality inventory that will be used in the two different 
administrations is the Goldberg Inventory.  It is also expected that those individuals who are 
engaging in self-deception perceive themselves as more favorable than others perceive them. 
As a result, it is expected that their self-ratings would be higher than the ratings provided by 
others.  
It is also hypothesized that individuals who engage primarily in self-deception will 
have a pattern of results consistent with previous research on self-deceptive enhancement 
(e.g., Taylor & Brown 1988; Schier & Carver, 1985; Holden & Fekken, 1989; Linden, 
Paulhus, & Dobsen, 1986; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Bandura, 1989). That is, it is expected that 
self-deceptors will be rated by others as higher in self-esteem, adjustment, general well-
being, and integrity than other-deceptors. Furthermore, it is expected that self-deceptors will 
be rated by others as higher in self-esteem, adjustment, and general well-being than non-
deceptors and that those individuals high in self-deception will be rated as lower in 
interpersonal skills than other-deceptors.   
 As a summary:   
Category 1:  Self-deceptors will be identified using the following decision 
rules: 
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a) Pass the threshold level on the SDE scale of the BIDR only (i.e., those 
who answer affirmatively to seven or more of the twenty items on the 
SDE scale of the BIDR and do not exceed a score of fourteen on the 
IM scale of the BIDR).  
b) The good impression scale and “fake good” scales will not surpass the 
threshold level (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good 
scale exceeding 60.60).  
c) Personality data received at Time 1 (i.e., answer honestly) and Time 2 
(i.e., answer as if applying for a job) are not different. 
d) Self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will be higher than those 
reports by informed observers and trained raters in the role play. 
 
The hypothesized outcome data that is expected for self-deceptors is as 
follows: 
 
a) Self-deceptors will be rated significantly higher in adjustment than 
other-deceptors and non-deceptors.  
b) Self-deceptors will be rated significantly higher in general well-being 
than other-deceptors and non-deceptors.  
c) Self-deceptors will be rated significantly higher in integrity than those 
identified as other-deceptors and mixed-deceptors. 
d) Self-deceptors will be rated significantly lower in interpersonal skills 
than those individuals rated as other-deceptors and mixed-deceptors.  
 
Category 2:  Other-Deceptors. Other-deceptors will be identified using the same 
methods used to identify self-deceptors. That is, other-deceptors will be identified through 
the use of social desirability scales, a directed faking study, and comparisons of self-report 
data to others’ ratings. Other-deceptors are expected to be those individuals who surpass the 
threshold scores of the IM scale (of the BIDR) and the fake good scale and the GI scale (of 
the CPI). It is also expected that these individuals will have a change in personality scores 
from T1 (i.e., answer honestly) to T2 (i.e., answer as if you are applying for a job). That is, 
they will present a higher socially desirable profile at T2 than at T1. Finally, at T2, as 
individuals are consciously trying to present a favorable image of themselves, the other-
deceptors should present self-report personality profiles that are more favorable than those 
reported by others. 
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Outcome data for other-deceptors is expected to be consistent with the outcomes 
expected for those individuals who engage in impression management. That is, based on 
previous research (e.g., Gilmore & Ferris, 1989; Kacmer et al., 1992; Wayne & Liden, 1995; 
Rosse, Stecher, Miller & Levin, 1998; Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 20023; Kasher & DePaulo, 
1996), it is expected that other-deceptors will be reported as being higher on interpersonal 
skills than those categorized as self-deceptors. It is also expected that they will be rated lower 
in integrity, adjustment, self-esteem, and general well-being than self-deceptors.    
 As a summary:  
 
Category 2: Other-deceptors will be identified using the following decision rules:   
 
a) Those who surpass the threshold level on the IM scale of the BIDR only (i.e., 
respond affirmatively to at least fourteen out of twenty of the items designed 
to measure other-deception).  
b) The social desirability scale and “fake good” scale will surpass the threshold 
level (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good scale exceeding 
60.60).   
c) A change in personality scores will be observed between T1 (answer honestly) 
and T2 (answer as if you are applying for a job). 
d) At T2, the self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will be higher than the 
ratings provided by others. At T1, the self-reports will be consistent with the 
ratings provided by others.  
 
Outcome data patterns expected are as follows: 
 
a) Other-deceptors will be rated significantly lower in adjustment, general well 
being, and integrity than self-deceptors. 
b) Other-deceptors will be rated significantly higher in social skills than self-
deceptors and non-deceptors. 
c) Other-deceptors will be have significantly lower levels of integrity than non-
deceptors.  
  
Category 3: Non-deceptors.  Non-deceptors will be identified as those individuals 
who one would expect to have good self-insight and do not engage in conscious other-
deception. That is, they are aware of their own personalities and do not intentionally take 
action to distort their personality data. As such, it is expected that they would not surpass the 
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threshold score on the SDE scale or the IM scale of the BIDR.  Furthermore, it is expected 
that the social desirability scale and the fake good scales should not be triggered.  It is also 
expected that they would present themselves the same if they were answering honestly and if 
they were applying for a job. Finally, self-reports should not be different than others’ reports 
of them.  
 Non-deceptors are those individuals who have a realistic view of themselves and do 
not consciously try to manage the impression they make. As a result, the outcomes expected 
are consistent with those expected who have similar tendencies in terms of seeing themselves 
realistically. Based on previous research (e.g., Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; 
Coyne & Gotlieb, 1983; Lewinsohn, Mischel, & Barton, 1980; Brown, 1986), it is expected 
that non-deceptors will be lower in self-esteem and well-being than self-deceptors. They will 
have higher integrity and lower levels of interpersonal skills in comparison to other-
deceptors.  
Category 3: Non-deceptors will be identified using the following decision rules: 
 
a) Those who do not trigger either the IM scale or SDE scale on the BIDR. 
b) The good impression scale and “fake good” scale will not surpass the 
threshold levels (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good scale 
exceeding 60.60). 
c) The scores on the Goldberg Inventory will not be different between Time 1 
(i.e., answer honestly) and Time 2 administration (i.e., answer as if you are 
applying for a job). 
d) Self-reports on the Goldberg Inventory will be consistent with those reported 
by the outside observers. 
 
Outcome data expected: 
  
a) Non-deceptors will have significantly lower levels of adjustment and general 
well-being than self-deceptors and mixed-deceptors. 
b) Non-deceptors will have significantly higher integrity than other-deceptors 
and mixed-deceptors. 
c) Non-deceptors will have significantly lower levels of interpersonal skills than 
other-deceptors and mixed-deceptors.  
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Category 4:  Mixed. A fourth and final category may emerge that for the purpose of 
the present study, will be called the “mixed category.”  It will contain those individuals who 
display both self-deception and other-deception tendencies. Individuals in the mixed category 
will be those who trigger the SDE scale of the BIDR (due to the self-deception component), 
the GI scale and the fake good scale will surpass the thresholds and T1 data will be less than 
T2 data (due to the other-deception component), and Goldberg inventory self-reports will be  
higher than other reports (due to both self-deception and other-deception).  
Mixed deceptors will be identified using the following decision rules: 
a) Trigger both the SDE scale and the IM scale on the BIDR. 
b) The GI scale and the fake good scale will both surpass the threshold level (i.e., 
the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good scale exceeding 60.60). 
c) At the T2 administration, self-report profiles will be higher than at the T1 
administration.   
d) Goldberg inventory self-report data will be higher than reports from outside 
observers and trained raters at both T1 and T2. 
 
The following outcomes are expected: 
 
a) Those in the mixed category will have significantly higher levels of 
adjustment and well-being in comparison to those in the no-deception and 
other-deception only categories.  
b) Those in the mixed category will have significantly lower integrity than those 
in the self-deception category and non-deception category.  
c) Those in the mixed category will have significantly higher levels of 
interpersonal skills in the self-deception and no-deception categories. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 320 participants were recruited through business school courses at a 
Midwestern university. Of these participants, 242 (76%) completed all four aspects of the 
study (i.e., they responded  to the Goldberg Inventory under “answer honestly” and “answer 
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as if you are applying for a job” conditions, took part in the role play, and submitted 
information from an outside observer). Given that the main goal of this study was to examine 
the role of multiple indicators of deception simultaneously, subsequent analyses included 
only those 242 participants with complete data.  
  Of these 242 participants, 124 (51%) were men and 107 (44%) were women. The 
remaining 11 (5%) did not report gender. The sample consisted of 174 (72%) Whites, 25 
(10%) African-Americans, 14 (6%) Asians, and 16 (7%) reported other ethnic backgrounds. 
The remaining 13 (5%) did not indicate race. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 56 with a 
mean age of 24.33 years and a standard deviation of 5.95 years. Of the group, 3 (1%) 
reported their class status as freshmen, 5 (2%) as sophomores, 120 (50%) as juniors, and 97 
(40%) as seniors. Seventeen (7%) did not report year in school. 
Measures 
Goldberg Inventory 
The personality inventory developed by Goldberg (1992) was used to collect self-
report data from participants (see Appendix A). Additionally, informed observers made 
ratings of the participant using this questionnaire. This inventory was created in order to 
replace the Big Five factor markers created by Norman (1963). The inventory consists of 100 
adjectives designed to measure the Big Five personality traits. However, in the interest of 
time, only those 40 adjectives used to assess extraversion and agreeableness were included in 
the present study. These scales were retained as they were deemed applicable to the job of 
customer service agent as well as being observable personality characteristics.  
Participants responded on a scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the extent to which each 
adjective described them (or if they were an informed observer, rated how descriptive each 
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.                                     
 
31
adjective was of the participant). Goldberg has found correlations among his inventory and 
other measures of the Big 5 that ranged from .46-.69 (Goldberg, 1992). This scale has also 
been used in previous research for the purpose of obtaining informant-rated personality. 
When used for collecting informant ratings, it has been found to add incremental validity in 
predicting job performance above and beyond self-report data (e.g., Mount, Barrick, & 
Strauss, 1994).    
For the present study, four combined mean scores were computed for each 
participant. These mean scores were computed for each participant on the self-report ratings 
of personality in both the “answer honestly” and “answer as if you are applying for a job” 
conditions, and the ratings that were made by informed observers and the trained role 
players.  These scores were calculated by computing the mean of all responses to the 40 
items on the inventory (after re-keying so that each was phrased affirmatively). The scale 
demonstrated adequate reliability across all four scoring conditions (alphas ranged from .91-
.97).   
Social Desirability Scales 
Good impression scale and fake good scale. The good impression scale and fake good 
scale of the CPI was given to participants. The good impression scale consists of 40 items to 
which individuals responded either true or false to indicate whether the item described them.  
Gough developed these items by using Ruch’s (1942) strategy of testing under normal 
instructions and then with instructions to fake good.  Following the administration, an item 
analysis showed significant differences in endorsement between the two conditions on 40 of 
the items. According to the technical manual (Gough, 1996), scores of thirty and above are 
used to indicate impression management.   
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The fake good scale is composed of a combination of five of the CPI’s folk scales 
(i.e., dominance, empathy, responsibility, well-being, and flexibility) along with the good 
impression scale (see Appendix B).  According to the technical manual, scores above 60.60 
indicate that the respondent is faking the inventory (Gough, 1996). The cut-off score was set 
in accordance with the findings of research conducted by Lanning (1989). To determine cut-
scores for the CPI, the author used 5 archival data sets from the CPI archives and 8 
computer-generated data sets to develop regression equations that could detect invalid 
protocols (i.e., regression equations that could detect fake-good, fake-bad, and random 
response patterns). Using the framework of signal detection theory, he determined cut-scores 
and tested these scores using 5 additional data sets. Results suggested that using the cut-
scores was an effective means of identifying participants who were faking-good, faking-bad, 
and responding randomly.  
 The items on the good impression scale and the fake good scales of the CPI were 
originally designed to be answered dichotomously (i.e., either true or false). However, for the 
purpose of consistency with other scales in this study, participants were asked to respond on 
a 1-7 scale and the items were later dichotomized. It was necessary to return these items to a 
dichotomy as the equations and cutoff scores created by Gough (1996) were based on 
dichotomous responses. Therefore, all items for which participants responded 5, 6, or 7 were 
recoded to 1 and all items rated as 1, 2, 3, or 4 were recoded to 0. The decision was made to 
adopt this coding strategy as items that were scored as 1, 2, 3, or 4 were those items that 
participants deemed to either be neutral or not true. A decision was made to include the 
rating of 4 in the “O” coded group as a rating of “neutral” indicated that the participants did 
not have a strong feeling as if the item was indicative of them.  Those items that were coded 
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5, 6, or 7 indicated that participants had rated those items as true of themselves. In 
accordance with the guidelines set forth by Gough, a sum was then computed using the 
dichotomized items.  The scale demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .87).  
Recall that the fake good scale is composed of five scales from the CPI (i.e., 
dominance, empathy, good impression, well-being, and flexibility). It was necessary to 
compute sums on each of these subscales as they were then entered into the fake good scale 
equation as unit weights (see Appendix B for the equation).  A reliability coefficient was not 
computed for the FG scale as it is derived using a combination of various scale scores.  
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. The BIDR was given to participants 
(see Appendix C). The instrument consists of 40 total statements, 20 of which refer to 
impression management (IM) and the remaining 20 refer to self-deceptive enhancement 
(SDE). Participants responded on a seven-point Likert scale 1 = not true of them, 7 = very 
true of them) to indicate how true the items were for them.  
In previous studies, reliabilities for the instrument have ranged from .83-.86 (Paulhus, 
1998).  In the present study the impression management scale demonstrated adequate 
reliability (α = .85) but a lower reliability coefficient was observed for the SDE scale (α = 
.68).  
In previous research, evidence of validity has been found for both scales. For 
example, the IM scale has been found to be responsive to the demands for impression 
management. That is, previous research has found that IM scores increase from private to 
public conditions (Paulhus, 1984; Booth-Kewley, Rosenfield, Edwards, and Alderton, 1992) 
and that anonymous testing decreases scores on the IM (Paulhus, 1998). The SDE scale has 
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been linked to a lack of insight into how one is seen by others and over-claiming (Paulhus, 
1998).  
In the present study, the scales were computed in accordance with the guidelines set 
by Paulhus (1998).  That is, only extreme responses were scored (i.e., 6 or 7 after re-keying). 
The rationale behind this scoring is that the extreme responses are more likely to indicate 
distortion (Paulhus, 1984). Therefore, each time a participant indicated an extreme response 
(i.e., 6 or 7 after re-keying) to an item, they were assigned one point. As such, an individual 
could receive a score of 0 to 20 for both the IM scale and the SDE scale with 0 being the 
lowest possible score and 20 being the highest possible score. According to the guidelines set 
forth by the author, scores in excess of 7 on the SDE scale are indicative of self-deceptive 
enhancement while scores in excess of 14 on the IM scale are suggestive of impression 
management.   
Outcome Measures 
Paulhus scale of adjustment. Adjustment was measured using a four-item scale 
developed by Paulhus (1998). Informed observers used a seven point scale to  (1 = not 
descriptive of participant, 7 = very descriptive of participant), rate whether the participant is 
happy, likes himself/herself, is well-adjusted, and is mentally healthy (see Appendix D). 
Reported reliabilities for this scale range from .68-.80 (Paulhus, 1998) and adequate 
reliability was found in the present study (α = .84).  For each participant an average score 
was computed with each item receiving equal weight.  
Satisfaction with Life Scale. Well-being of the participants was assessed by asking 
informants to complete the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) about the participant (see 
Appendix E). The SLWS is a five-item scale designed to measure one’s basic satisfaction 
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with aspects of his/her life. The five items are rated on a 1-7 scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= 
strongly agree). Due to the original scale being self-report, the items were modified only so 
that they could be used by informed observers to make ratings of participants.  
 The SWLS has shown adequate test-retest correlations of .80 and above in the short-
term (Diener, Emmons, & Larsen, 1985) and respectable correlations in the longer- term 
(e.g., .50 in ten weeks and .54 in four years) (Pavot & Diener, 1993) and adequate reliability 
was found in the present study (α = .79).  Furthermore, the SLWS has been shown to 
demonstrate convergent validity with a variety of constructs of interest, including other self-
report measures of satisfaction with life satisfaction and well-being (e.g., Pavo, Diener, 
Colvin, & Sandik, 1981). An average score on satisfaction with life was computed for each 
participant.  
Interpersonal Competence Scale. Informants were asked to rate the interpersonal 
skills of the participants using Baird and Holland’s (1968) Interpersonal Competence Scale 
(see Appendix F). The scale is based upon previous work by Foote and Cattrell (1955) and 
consists of 20 items designed to assess basic interpersonal skills. An example item is “I have 
a reputation for being able to cope with difficult people.”  The items were re-written to be 
reflective of the participant, rather than the informant. Furthermore, five items were removed 
that address physical condition (e.g., I have good coordination).  Holland and Baird reported 
an internal consistency (KR-20 because the items were originally designed to be answered 
either true or false) of .67 for women and .69 for men. The authors do not report any 
suggested hypotheses for why the differences in reliability across genders was observed.  
Evidence for construct validity has been found as the scale positively correlates with a 
variety of constructs including self-confidence, speaking ability, cheerfulness, sensitivity to 
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others’ needs, social competency, and leadership (Holland & Baird, 1968). In the present 
study, the instrument demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .84).   An average score was 
computed on interpersonal skills for each participant with each item receiving equal unit 
weight.  
Informant-rated integrity. Informed observers were asked to rate participants on five 
items designed by the researcher to capture integrity (see Appendix G). Informed observers 
were asked to respond to the items on a 1-7 Likert scale (1 = not descriptive of the 
participant, 7 = very descriptive of the participant). The scale was found to demonstrate 
adequate reliability (α = .82).  For each participant, an average score was computed on 
integrity. 
Design and Procedure 
This procedure section consists of two parts. The first part of this section is an in-
depth description of how each traditionally-used “faking” study (i.e., directed faking study, 
social desirability scales, and external criteria measures) was conducted in the current 
research design. The second part of this section is a design overview and is provided to give 
the reader a broad overview of the data collection processes.  It also consists of a sequential 
summary of the steps involved.  Providing these two sections separately allows the reader to 
gain a better understanding of how each type of study was conducted and an overview of the 
steps involved. 
Types of studies 
Directed Faking Study 
The directed faking study was completed in two administrations, taking place 
approximately two weeks apart. The administration instructions were 
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counterbalanced in an effort to eliminate any possible order effects. It should be noted 
that order effects were observed for the difference scores between participant 
responses in the “answer honestly” administration and the “answer as if you are apply 
for a job” administration.  
In the “answer honestly” administration, participants were given the following 
instruction set before taking the extraversion and agreeableness scales of the Goldberg 
inventory:  
“As you are completing these materials, imagine that you are being assessed for your 
own self-knowledge and that your results will be returned to you in an anonymous 
manner. Therefore, it is in your own best interest to answer these questions honestly 
and gain the most self-insight possible from the experience.” 
 
In the “answer as if you are applying for a job” administration, participants completed 
the scales of the Goldberg inventory as well as the CPI’s fake good and good impression 
scales and the BIDR under the following instruction set:  
“I’d like you to imagine you are applying for a job. As part of the selection 
process you were asked to respond to this personality questionnaire. Keep in 
mind that this is part of the selection process.”  
 
Social Desirability Scales 
 
 The fake good scale, the good impression scale, and the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding were administered in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” 
condition. It was decided to administer these scales under this instruction set rather than the 
“answer honestly” condition because under this administration, participants presumably have 
a motivation to consciously distort their responses, therefore, giving the scales the 
opportunity to detect other-deception.  
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External Criteria Ratings 
Informed observers. Informed observers were identified by all participants in the first 
administration (regardless of whether it was the “answer honestly” condition or “answer as if 
you are applying for a job” condition). Participants were asked to choose someone who met 
the following criteria: someone whom they felt “knows them well”, has known them for at 
least one year, and someone with whom they interact at least once per week.  Participants 
were given a packet to give their observer. These observers were asked to complete the 
following items to describe the participant: extraversion and agreeableness scales of the 
Goldberg inventory, Paulhus’ scale of adjustment, Satisfaction with Life Survey, 
Interpersonal Competence Scale, and the integrity scale designed by the researcher. They 
were asked to return the data in an envelope addressed to the researcher.   
Trained raters. Participants took part in a 10-minute scripted interaction with one of 
two trained role players (see Appendix H). Prior to beginning the study, the role players 
discussed and practiced the script to ensure that the roles would be played similarly. In order 
to ensure consistency, the role players also calibrated on scoring and role playing several 
times throughout the data collection process. Following the completion of the study, an 
independent sample t-test indicated that the scores reported by Trained Rater #1 (M = 4.50, 
SD = .92) did not differ significantly from the scores reported by Trained Rater #2 (M = 
4.55, SD = 1.01), t (233) = .45, p >.05.  
In the role play, the participant played the role of a customer service agent while the 
trained role player adopted the role of an angry customer.  Following the completion of the 
role play, the role player made ratings of the participant’s extraversion and agreeableness 
using the Goldberg Inventory scales of extraversion and agreeableness.  
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Design overview 
 Undergraduate students were invited to take part in this study through recruitment 
efforts in undergraduate business courses.  Participants were told that researchers were 
interested in studying the personality characteristics of undergraduate students. In all classes, 
instructors offered extra credit points in return for student participation. The study was 
conducted using a two-part data collection process, with the administration sessions spaced 
approximately two weeks apart. In addition, the manipulations were counterbalanced in an 
effort to avoid potential order effects with 117 participants receiving the “answer honestly” 
instructions in the first administration and 124 participants receiving the “answer as if you 
are applying for a job” instructions in the first administration. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
that order effects were present.  Participants receiving “answer honestly” instructions first 
had larger difference scores (M  = .13, SD = .48) than those who received the “answer as if 
you are applying for a job” instructions first (M  = .003, SD .40) F (1, 239)  = 5.33, p< .05, 
eta2 = .02.  
In the first administration, all participants were asked to complete informed consent 
forms, report demographic information, and were given a packet of information to distribute 
to their informed raters. One-half of the participants (hereafter Group 1) were asked to 
complete the Goldberg inventory scales of agreeableness and extraversion under “answer 
honestly” instructions. The other half of the participants (hereafter Group 2) were given the 
scales on the Goldberg inventory and asked to respond to under “answer as if you are 
applying for a job” instructions. Group 2 participants were also asked to complete the BIDR, 
fake good scale, and good impression scale at this time.  
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In the second administration, all participants were given a verbal reminder to ensure 
that their informed observers completed the materials in the packet and returned them to the 
researcher. Group 1 participants were asked to complete the Goldberg inventory scales under 
“answer as if you are applying for a job” instructions. They were also asked to complete the 
BIDR, fake good, and good impression scales. Group 2 participants completed the Goldberg 
inventory under “answer honestly” instructions. Additionally, all participants took part in a 
10-minute role-play with a trained rater.   
The following Table provides a summary of the multiple steps that were involved in 
the data collection process: 
 
Administration Group 1 
 
Group 2 
Time 1 • Informed consent 
• Demographic 
information 
• “Answer Honestly” 
instruction 
• Goldberg inventory 
• Distribution and 
instruction on 
informant packages 
• Informed consent 
• Demographic 
information 
• “Answer as if 
applying for job” 
instruction 
• Goldberg inventory 
• BIDR, fake good, 
and good impression 
inventories 
• Distribution and 
instruction on 
informant packages 
Time 2 • “Answer as if applying 
for job” instructions 
• Goldberg inventory 
• BIDR, Fake good, and 
good impression 
inventories 
• Reminder of informant 
ratings 
• Role play 
• Debrief form 
• “Answer honestly” 
instruction 
• Goldberg inventory 
• Reminder of 
informant ratings 
• Role play 
• Debrief form 
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Results 
Descriptive Analyses 
 Overall means, standard deviations, internal consistency coefficients, and 
correlations were computed for all scales, and are shown in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 
1, although all 242 participants took part in all aspects of the study, they did not always fully 
complete the surveys. As a result, several of the scale scores have sample sizes that are less 
than 242 (i.e., good impression, fake good scale, adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, 
and satisfaction with life). When any data were missing from the scales, participants were 
excluded from any analyses involving those instruments.  Sample sizes for the analyses 
ranged from 226-242.     
Computation of Difference Scores 
 Five difference scores were computed for each participant on the Goldberg Inventory 
across the four different administrations of the scales (i.e., “answer honestly”, “answer as if 
you are applying for a job”, informed observer and role play). One difference score was 
computed for each participant by subtracting individual scores in the “answer honestly” 
condition from individual scores in the “answer as if applying for a job” condition. 
Difference scores were also computed for the following combinations: apply for a job-role 
play, apply for a job-informed other, answer honestly -role play, and answer honestly-
informed other (see Table 1).  
Manipulation Check 
In an effort to understand whether the instruction manipulation was successful, it was 
necessary to compare the group in the “answer honestly” condition to the group scores in the 
“answer as if you are applying for a job” condition. According to t-test results, scores were 
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significantly higher in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition (M = 5.46, SD 
= .63) than they were in the “answer honestly” condition (M = 5.39, SD  = .61) t (241) = 
2.32, p<.05, suggesting that the manipulation was successful.  
Categorization 
 Data analysis.  The following constraints were used to place participants into the 
category of self-deceptor, other-deceptor, non-deceptor, or mixed-deceptor. If participants 
did not fit the following constraints, they would be placed into an “other” category.  
Category 1: Those who fit the following criteria were coded as self-deceptors:  
 
a) Pass the threshold level on the SDE scale of the BIDR only.  
 (i.e., those who answer affirmatively to seven or more of the twenty 
items on the SDE scale of the BIDR). 
b) The good impression scale and “fake good” scales will not surpass the 
threshold level (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good 
scale exceeding 60.60).  
c) Personality data received at Time 1 (i.e., answer honestly) and Time 2 
(i.e., answer as if applying for a job) are not different. 
d) Self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will be higher than those 
reports by informed observers and trained raters in the role play.  
 
 
Category 2: Those who fit the following criteria were coded as other-
deceptors.  
 
a) Those who surpass the threshold level on the IM scale of the BIDR 
only (i.e., respond affirmatively to at least fourteen out of twenty of 
the items designed to measure other-deception).  
b) The social desirability scale and “fake good” scale will surpass the 
threshold level (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good 
scale exceeding 60.60).  In the T2 condition (i.e., answer honestly 
condition). 
c) A change in mean personality scores will be observed between T1 
(answer honestly) and T2 (answer as if you are applying for a job). 
d) At T2, the self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will be higher than 
the ratings provided by others. At T1, the self-reports will be 
consistent with the ratings provided by others.  
 
Category 3: Those who fit the following criteria were coded as non-deceptors:  
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a) Those who do not trigger either IM scale or SDE scale on the BIDR. 
b) The good impression scale and “fake good” scale will not surpass the 
threshold levels (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good 
scale exceeding 60.60). 
c) The mean scores on the Goldberg Inventory will not differ between 
Time 1 (i.e., answer honestly) and Time 2 administration (i.e., answer 
as if you are applying for a job). 
d) Self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will be consistent with those 
reported by the outside observers. 
 
Category 4: Those who fit the following criteria were coded as mixed-
deceptors:  
 
a) Trigger both the SDE scale and the IM scale on the BIDR. 
b) The GI scale and the fake good scale will both surpass the threshold 
level (i.e., the GI scale being above 30 and the fake good scale 
exceeding 60.60). 
c) At the T2 administration, self-reports on the Goldberg inventory will 
be higher than at the T1 administration.   
d) Goldberg inventory self-report data will be higher than reports from 
outside observers and trained raters at both T1 and T2. 
 
Category 5: Those participants that did not fit into any of the above-mentioned 
groups will be placed into an “other” category.  
 
Using the above-mentioned criteria, no participants were included in the self-
deceptor, other-deceptor, and mixed deceptor groups (n = 0). However, 93 participants met 
the criteria for inclusion in the non-deceptor group. All remaining participants were then 
placed into Category 5 and were denoted as “some deception” group (n = 146). By definition, 
those in the non-deceptor group were found to be free from engaging in any type of 
deception while those in the “some deception” group were identified by one or more criteria 
as having engaged in some type of deception. As such, an examination of the differences 
between these two groups of participants was conducted.  
Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations were computed 
for the two separate groups (see Table 3, 4, 5, and 6).  Four one-way ANOVAs were 
computed to determine whether these two groups demonstrated any significant differences on 
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the outcome variables (see Table 7). No significant differences were found on scores of 
adjustment F (1, 237) = .01, p > .05, eta2=.00, integrity F (1, 237)  = .38, p >.05, eta2=.00, 
interpersonal competency F (1, 237) = .42, p >.05, eta2=.00, or satisfaction with life F (1, 
237) = .24, p >.05, eta2=.00.  
Alternative 2: Loosening the Original Constraints 
 Given that the objective of this study was to compare different methods of assessing 
deception and better understand potential outcomes of self-deception and other-deception, it 
was necessary to conduct additional analyses. One such analysis was an attempt to relax the 
original constraints (e.g., lowering the IM score requirement) to determine whether there 
were any other reasonable methods for identifying self-deceptors, other-deceptors, mixed 
deceptors, and non-deceptors. However, this method was also ineffective in identifying 
different types of deceptors. 
Alternative 3: Analysis by Type of Study 
 Given that the aforementioned strategies did not result in categorizing participants 
across the different study types, analyses were conducted separately by the four individual 
study types as a means of understanding the data. However, it should be noted that in many 
of the studies below, the groups consistently contained unequal sample sizes. This unequal 
distribution among the groups led to lower power, lessening the likelihood of finding 
significant differences among the groups even if they did exist. In some cases, the 
distribution was so unequal that it was deemed inappropriate to conduct further analyses.  
However, where appropriate, two separate analyses were conducted for each different type of 
study. In the first analysis, the original constraints were used to form groups for comparisons 
purposes.  In the second analysis, a mean cut-score approach was used. That is, those who 
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scored above the mean were included in Group 1 and those who scored below the mean were 
included in Group 2. 
All difference scores were analyzed using the two aforementioned approaches as well 
as a third method. The third approach was conducted in order to gain an understanding of 
whether the direction of difference scores was related to the outcome variables. That is, it 
was important to understand whether there were any outcome differences for the participants 
who rated themselves higher than they were rated by others compared to those who rated 
themselves lower than they were rated by others.  In the directed faking study, analyses were 
conducted to determine whether there were any differences in outcomes dependent upon 
whether participants rated themselves higher in the “answer honestly” condition compared to 
the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition.  Additionally, for all participants, 
comparisons were made between the scores obtained in the “apply for a job” condition and 
scores from the role play, the “apply for a job condition” and scores from informed others, 
“answer honestly” condition and scores from the role play and finally the differences 
between the “answer honestly” condition and the informed others.   For each of these 
comparisons, one-way ANOVAs were computed using the cut-score as 0 to separate 
participants into two different groups: those that had a difference score above 0 and those 
that had a difference score that was less than 0.  Participants who had a difference score of 0 
(i.e., their ratings matched the ratings given by others perfectly) were dropped from 
subsequent analyses. The decision was made to drop these participants as there were not 
enough individuals to comprise a group that would be large enough to effectively compare 
against the other groups.  
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Directed faking study.  The original hypothesis of this study was that the difference 
scores between the “answer honestly” and the “answer as if you are applying for a job” 
conditions were suggestive of other-deception.  The original constraints were that difference 
scores in excess of 2 were suggestive of other-deception (i.e., participants who raised their 
scores by 2 or more points in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition). 
However, in the present study, there were no participants who raised their score by 2 or more 
points. As a result, no analysis were computed using the original constraints.  
In order to use the mean cut-score approach, it was necessary to compute a mean for 
the difference scores (M = .06, SD = .43). Using the mean as a cut-score approach, 95 
participants scored above the mean while 145 scored below the mean. No participants had a 
difference of exactly .06. A one-way ANOVA was computed using each of the outcome 
variables as dependent variables and whether participants scored above or below the mean as 
the grouping variable (see Table 8). Using this approach, no significant results were observed 
on reported levels of adjustment, integrity or satisfaction with life (see Table 8).  Significant 
differences were observed for the outcome variable of interpersonal skills F (1, 238) = 4.41, 
p<.05, eta2=.02, with participants with mean difference score greater than .06 receiving 
higher interpersonal competency ratings (M = 5.27, SD = .77) than those with difference 
scores less than .06 (M = 5.05, SD = .81).    
A frequency analysis revealed that 53% of participants actually rated themselves 
lower in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition than they did in the “answer 
honestly” condition. Three participants (1%) rated themselves the same in the “answer 
honestly” condition as they did in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition 
(i.e., they had a difference score of 0).  The remaining 46% rated themselves higher in the 
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“answer as if you are applying for a job” condition than they did in the “answer honestly” 
condition. The three participants who rated themselves the same across the two conditions 
were dropped from the analysis and four one-way ANOVAs were computed using whether 
difference scores were greater than or less than 0 as the grouping variable. No significant 
differences were observed for adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, or satisfaction with 
life.  
Social Desirability Scales 
GI scale. Of the 242 participants, only 9 surpassed the cutoff of 30 that was suggested 
by Gough (1996) as indicative of impression management. Given that using this cut-off score 
would lead to a very unequal distribution across the two groups and that one group would 
have only 9 participants, it was deemed inappropriate to conduct group comparisons. 
The mean score for the GI scale was computed (M = 23.81, SD = 6.61). Using the 
mean cut-score approach, 121 participants were found to have rated themselves higher than 
the mean while 118 participants scored themselves lower than the mean on the GI. No 
participants scored exactly 23.81.  No significant results were observed for satisfaction with 
life and interpersonal skills (see Table 9). However, significant results were obtained for 
adjustment F (1,237) = 5.67, p<.05, eta2=.02, and integrity F (1,237) = 4.05, p<.05, eta2=.02. 
Participants who scored higher than the mean on the GI were rated as having higher levels of 
adjustment (M = 6.00, SD = .90) than those participants whose scored themselves lower than 
the mean (M = 5.73, SD = .88). Similarly, participants who scored higher on the GI were 
rated as having higher levels of integrity (M = 6.40, SD = .84) than those who scored lower 
than the mean on the GI (M  = 6.17, SD = .92).  
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Fake good scale.  In the present study, only 3 of the 242 participants surpassed the 
cutoff level of 60.60 that was deemed by Gough (1996) as indicative that the participant is 
inflating scores on the CPI. Given the unequal distribution across the two groups and the fact 
that one group would consist of only 3 participants, it was deemed inappropriate to conduct 
analyses using the original constraints.  
Using the mean cut-score approach (M = 56.14, SD = 4.05), 111 participants were 
placed into the above the mean group while 115 participants were placed into the below the 
mean group (see Table 10). No participants scored directly at the mean. Significant results 
were not obtained for integrity or satisfaction with life. Significant results were obtained for 
the outcome variables of adjustment F (1, 224) = 4.26, p<.05, eta2=.02, and interpersonal 
skills F (1, 224)  = 6.65, p<.05, eta2=.03. Participants who scored higher than the mean on the 
FG scale were rated as having higher levels of adjustment (M = 6.00, SD = .87) than those 
who scored below the mean (M = 5.76, SD = .91).  Participants who scored higher than the 
mean were rated as having higher levels of interpersonal skills (M = 5.28, SD = .76) than 
those who scored lower than the mean (M = 5.01, SD = .81).   
Self-deceptive enhancement scale.  Of the group of participants, 81 reported SDE 
scores that were in excess of 7, the score set by Paulhus as being indicative of self-deceptive 
enhancement (see Table 11).  The rest of the group (n = 159) reported results on the SDE 
scale that were less than or equal to 7. Participants were placed into one of two groups: those 
who had an SDE score greater than 7 and those who had an SDE score that was less than or 
equal to 7.  ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether significant differences existed 
between the two groups. Significant results were not obtained for adjustment, integrity, or 
interpersonal skills  Significant results were obtained for satisfaction with life F (1, 238) = 
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7.15, p<.05, eta2=.03, with those participants who scored themselves lower than 7 on the 
SDE scale (M = 4.93, SD = 1.01) being rated as having higher levels of satisfaction with life 
than those who scored themselves higher than the mean (M = 4.55, SD = 1.10).  
Using the mean cut-score approach (M = 4.56 SD = .60), participants were sorted into 
two groups, those who scored themselves above the mean on the SDE (n = 114) and those 
who scored themselves below the mean (n = 126). No participants scored rated themselves 
exactly the same as the mean.  A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant results on 
adjustment, integrity, or interpersonal skills. Significant results were obtained for satisfaction 
with life F (1, 238) = 4.02, p>.05, eta2=.02, with participants reporting higher levels of SDE 
being rated as having lower levels of satisfaction with life (M = 4.65, SD = 1.09) than those 
participants reporting levels of SDE below the mean (M= 4.93, SD = 1.00).  
Impression management scale.  Using the scores set forth by Paulhus as indicators of 
other-deception (i.e., IM scores of more than 14), only 14 participants were identified as 
impression managers. Given the small sample size that would be present in the group 
identified as impression managers and the unequal distribution across the two groups, it was 
deemed to be inappropriate to conduct comparisons using the original constraints. 
Using the mean cut-score approach (M = 4.13, SD = .90) participants were sorted into 
two groups: those with scores above the mean (n = 123) and those with scores below the 
mean (n = 117). No participants scored directly at the mean. No significant results were 
obtained for adjustment, integrity, satisfaction with life or interpersonal skills (see Table 12).    
Apply for a job and role play score. The first difference scores analyzed were the 
differences in self-report in the “apply for a job” condition and how participants were 
perceived by the trained raters in the role play (see Table 13).  For each participant, the score 
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obtained in the role play condition was subtracted from the self-report score in the “answer as 
if you are applying for a job condition”. Using the original constraints (i.e., that participants 
much score themselves at least two points higher on the Goldberg Inventory than they were 
rated in the role play), participants were sorted into two categories:  those who rated 
themselves two or more points higher in the “answer as if you are apply for a job” condition 
(n = 37) being placed into one category while those who did not surpass this threshold (n = 
203) were placed into the second category.  No participant had a difference score of exactly 
two.  Four one-way ANOVAs revealed no differences for adjustment, integrity, interpersonal 
skills, or satisfaction with life.  
A mean cut –score approach was also taken (M = .93, SD = 1.01). Of the group, 116 
participants had difference scores that were above the mean while 124 had difference scores 
that were below the mean. No participant had a difference score of exactly .93. No significant 
results were obtained for adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, or satisfaction with life.   
Of the group, 201 (84%) scored themselves higher in the “answer as if you are 
applying for a job” condition than they were scored by the role players, while 38 (16%) 
scored themselves lower in the “answer as if you are applying for a job” condition than they 
were rated by role players. It should be noted that one participant was dropped from this 
analysis as the score reported by the role players was the exact same score reported by the 
participant. Three one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant differences in adjustment, 
integrity, or satisfaction with life (see Table 13).  However, significant differences were 
observed in rating of interpersonal skills F (1, 237) = 4.05, p < .05, eta2=.02 with those 
participants who scored themselves higher than they were rated in the role play receiving 
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higher ratings on interpersonal skills (M = 5.18, SD =.79) than those individuals who rated 
themselves lower than they were rated in the role play (M = 4.90, SD = .81).  
Apply for a job and informed other score. The second difference scores computed 
were the differences between participants’ self reports in the “apply for a job” condition 
versus how they were rated by their informed observers (see Table 14). Participants were 
divided into two groups: those who scored themselves at least 2 points higher than they 
scored themselves in the “answer as if you are applying for a job condition” than they were 
rated by their informed observer.  However, only three participants rated themselves two or 
more points higher than they were rated by their informed observers. As a result, no further 
analysis were computed using the original constraints.  
The mean difference between the two conditions was computed to be -.11. That is, on 
average, participants scored themselves .11 lower than they were scored by their informed 
observers. Using this mean, participants were sorted into two groups: those who had a 
difference score greater than the mean (n = 113) and those who had a difference score less 
than the mean (n = 127).  Four one-way ANOVAs were computed comparing the two groups 
on the four outcome variables. Significant results were obtained for adjustment F (1, 238) = 
34.78, p <.0001, eta2=.13, integrity F (1, 238) = 5.77, p <.05, eta2=.02, interpersonal skills F 
(1, 238) = 45.38 p < .001, eta2=.16, and satisfaction with life F (1, 238) = 24.22 p <.001, 
eta2=.09. For all outcome variables, those participants who rated themselves higher than the 
mean difference were rated lower on all outcome variables.   
Of the group, 43% rated themselves higher than they were rated by their informed 
observers. The remaining 57% rated themselves lower than they were rated by their informed 
observers. No participants rated themselves exactly the same as they had been rated by their 
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.                                     
 
52
informed observer.  Four one-way ANOVAs were computed using whether participants 
scored themselves higher or lower than their informed observers as the grouping variable and 
the four outcome variables a dependent variables.  Significant results were obtained for 
adjustment F (1, 238) = 47.66, p< .0001, eta2=.17, integrity F (1, 238) = 4.08 p<.05, eta2=.02, 
interpersonal skills F (1, 238) = 44.72, p <.0001, eta2=.16, and satisfaction with life F (1, 
238) = 30.84, p <.001, eta2=.12. Those participants who rated themselves higher on the 
Goldberg Inventory than they were rated by informed observers were rated as having lower 
levels of adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, and satisfaction with life than those who 
saw themselves less favorably than their informed observers. 
Answer honestly scores and role play scores. Difference scores were obtained by 
subtracting the average role play scores from the self-report scores that were reported in the 
“answer honestly condition”. Out of the sample, 32 participants had a two or more point 
difference in scores while the remaining 207 participants did not have a two point difference 
in scores. Four one way ANOVAs were computed. Significant results were not observed for 
adjustment, integrity, and satisfaction with life. However significant results were obtained for 
interpersonal skills F (1, 237) = 6.72, p<.05, eta2=.03 with those participants who had larger 
difference scores (M = 5.47, SD = .68) being seen as having higher levels of interpersonal 
skills than those who had lower reported difference scores (M = 5.08, SD = .81).   
Using the mean cut-score approach (M = .87, SD = 1.02), 121 participants of the 
sample had difference scores that were below the mean difference score while 119 
participants had scores that were above the mean group difference score. Four one-way 
ANOVAs were computed and no significant differences were found for adjustment, integrity, 
interpersonal skills or satisfaction with life (see Table 15).   
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Participants were then divided into two groups, those who scored themselves higher 
than they were rated by the role players ( n = 194) and those who rated themselves lower than 
they were rated by the trained role players (n = 45). Four one-way ANOVAs revealed no 
significant differences among the groups on adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, or 
satisfaction with life (see Table 15).  
Answer honestly and informed others score. Difference scores were computed by 
subtracting the scores obtained in the informed other condition from the self-report scores in 
the answer honestly condition (see Table 16). Using the original constraints (i.e., the 
difference score must be two or greater) only 3 participants were included in the group that 
met the original constraints. As a result, no analysis was conducted using the difference score 
of 2 as the grouping factor.  
Using the mean cut-score approach (M = -.18, SD  = .87), participants were divided 
into two groups: those who had a difference score greater than the mean (n = 110) and those 
who had a difference score that was less than the mean (n = 130). No participants had a 
difference score of exactly -.18. Four one-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences for 
adjustment F (1, 238) = 45.09 p<.001, eta2=.16, interpersonal skills F (1, 238) = 44.43, p < 
.001, eta2=.16, and satisfaction with life F (1, 238) = 18.89, p <.01, eta2=.07. Participants 
who had difference scores that were greater than -.18 were rated as having lower levels of 
adjustment (M = 5.48, SD = .93) than those who had difference scores that were less than -
.18 (M = 6.19, SD = .72). Similarly, those participants who had a difference scores that were 
greater than -.18 were rated as having lower levels of satisfaction with life (M = 4.49, SD = 
1.10) than those who had difference scores that were less than -.18 (M = 5.06, SD = .94). 
Significant results were not obtained for integrity. 
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Next, participants were grouped into those who scored themselves higher than their 
informed observers (n = 89) and those who score themselves lower than they were scored by 
their informed observers (n = 147). Four people were dropped from this analysis as they had 
scores that were exactly that same as they were rated by their informed observers. Four one-
way ANOVAs revealed significant results for adjustment F (1, 234) = 44.20, p<.001, 
eta2=.16, integrity F (1, 234) = 4.90, p<.01, eta2=.02, interpersonal skills F (1, 234) = 42.69, p 
<.001, eta2=.15 and satisfaction with life F (1, 234) = 24.61, p<.001, eta2=.10.  
Alternative 4: Using Regression 
 
 Using ANOVAs dictates that participants must be divided into different groups for 
comparison purposes. While valuable, this approach leads to a loss of variability in the 
indicators of deception (e.g., a participant who scores 1 point below the mean on a social 
desirability scale is treated the same as a participant who scores 1.5 points below the mean). 
In an effort to take advantage of the full range of scores of the predictor variables, two 
regression analyses were computed: one to assess whether hypothesized indicators of self-
deception would predict any of the four outcome variables and a second to assess whether 
hypothesized indicators of other-deception would predict outcomes.  As stated in the original 
hypotheses of this study, the indicators of self-deception were scores on the SDE  and the 
difference scores for the following combinations: answer honestly-informed other, answer 
honestly-role play, and apply for a job-answer honestly. The hypothesized indicators of 
other-deception are scores on the fake good scale, impression management scale, and the 
following difference scores: apply for a job-informed other, apply for a job-role play, and 
apply for a job-answer honestly.   
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Indicators of self-deception. It was hypothesized that SDE scores and several 
difference scores (i.e., difference scores between the “answer honestly” condition and 
informed other ratings, difference scores between the “answer honestly” condition and role 
play ratings, and difference scores between the “answer honestly” and “answer as if you are 
applying for a job)  would be predictors of the outcome variables. As such, four separate 
regression equations were computed in which these variables served as the independent 
variables and each of the four outcome variables served as dependent variables (i.e., 
adjustment, integrity, interpersonal competency skills, and satisfaction with life). As there 
were no a priori hypotheses about the strength of the predictors, all four variables were 
entered into the equation simultaneously (see Table 17).  
Examination of the F statistics revealed that all four regression equations were 
significant (p<.05). In predicting adjustment, examination of the beta weights revealed that 
out of the four predictors, two of the difference scores were predictive: answer honestly-
informed other (β = -.51) and apply for a job-answer honestly (β = .18)  (p<.01). Overall, the 
predictors accounted for 25% of the variance in adjustment. For integrity, 6% of the variance 
was accounted for by the predictors. Only one of the four predictors was significant which 
was difference score of answer honestly-informed other negatively predicted ratings on 
integrity (β = -.23). In predicting interpersonal skills, all four variables were significant. SDE 
score (β =- .13), answer honestly – informed other (β = -.58), answer honestly – role play (β 
= .11) and apply for job – answer honestly (β = .20) and 31% of the variance was accounted 
for by these variables.  Only one predictor was significant in predicting satisfaction with life 
which was answer honestly-informed other (β = -.40). Overall, the variables accounted for 
15% of the variance in satisfaction with life.   
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Indicators of Other-deception. 
 In order to examine the relationship between the hypothesized indicators of other-
deception, four additional regression equations were computed using the outcome variables 
as the dependent variables. However, in these regression equations, the GI scale of the CPI,  
the fake good scale of the CPI, IM scale of the BIDR, the difference  scores between the  
“answer as if applying for a job” condition and role play condition, and “answer as if you are 
apply for a job” and informed other conditions. For all four outcome variables, examination 
of the F statistic revealed that all regression equations were significant (p<.01).  
Overall, the variables accounted for 25% of the variance in adjustment scores.  The 
difference score between answer honestly and informed other negatively predicted 
adjustment (β = -.52).  For the outcome variable of integrity, only 8% of the variance was 
accounted for by the predictors with the only significant predictor being apply for a job-
informed other (β = -.23).  For interpersonal skills, the predictors explained 30% of the 
variance with the difference score of “apply for a job” and informed other was significant (β 
= -.54). For satisfaction with life, 15% of the variance was explained by the predictors and 
the only significant variable was the difference score between the scores in the “apply for a 
job” condition and the informed other condition (β = -.40).  
Discussion 
 
Multiple studies have been conducted examining the role of deception in personality 
testing. The present study was intended to add to this body of literature by using multiple 
methods of detecting deception simultaneously and identifying potential implications of both 
self-deception and other-deception. Although it was unsuccessful in testing the original 
hypotheses, it still made multiple contributions to the literature. First, it utilized multiple 
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methods of detecting deception simultaneously and provided insight into potential 
implications.  Second, it examined deception as a two-dimensional construct, using self-
deception and other-deception as the organizing framework. Although several significant 
results were found, it is necessary to preface these findings with a word of caution. First, 
given the large number of analyses, the opportunity for Type I error is also increased.  
Second, according to the effect size conventions set forth by Cohen (1988), the effect sizes 
for these results were small (i.e., effect sizes ranged from .02-.17). As a result, it should be 
noted that the theoretical and practical implications of the results may be quite limited as 
only small differences were found between the groups on outcome variables. However, the 
results are still important to discuss as they provide some insight into the relationships 
between these methods of detecting deception and important outcomes. Additionally, they 
provide direction for future research. Replicating this study in an applicant sample or with 
another sample that may have a hypothesized higher level of motivation to perform well than 
participants in the present study may reveal larger effect sizes. In turn, a finding of larger 
effect sizes would suggest greater practical and theoretical implications.  
One of the most consistent themes throughout the findings was that there were 
significant relationships between how people saw themselves in both Goldberg Inventory 
self-report conditions and how they were rated by others who knew them well.  Specifically, 
the greater the discrepancy between how people rated themselves in the “answer honestly” 
condition and how they were rated by someone who knew them well, the lower they were 
rated on adjustment, integrity, interpersonal skills, and satisfaction with life. The same 
pattern held true for the discrepancy between how people rated themselves in the “answer as 
if you are applying for a job” condition and how they were rated by someone who knew them 
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well. Those individuals who had views of themselves that were closely aligned with how 
others saw them were rated as having higher levels of adjustment, integrity, interpersonal 
skills, and satisfaction with life. Another finding was that having self-ratings higher than 
ratings received from informed others was related to receiving lower ratings on the outcome 
variables. Taken together, these results suggest that individuals who have views of 
themselves that are consistent with how others perceive them are better adjusted, possess 
greater interpersonal skills, have higher levels of integrity, and higher satisfaction with life. 
While inconsistent with some of the more recent thinking on psychological well-being (e.g., 
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Scheier & Carver, 1985), these findings are consistent with more 
traditional conceptualizations of good mental health (e.g., Allport, 1987; Vaillant, 1977; 
Jourard & Landsman, 1980; Haan, 1977), in which it was believed that having a realistic 
view of oneself was a necessary condition for good psychological health.  
However, some words of caution are important in interpretation of the data. 
Examination of the correlation coefficients suggests some evidence for a methods effect. 
Specifically, moderate to large correlations were observed between all four outcome 
variables and the responses to the ratings on the Goldberg Inventory (r’s range from .27-.74) 
and some moderate to large correlations among the outcome variables themselves (r’s range 
from .21-.62). Taken together, these results suggest that informed raters may have rated 
participants high or low across all variables.  As the survey including the informed-other 
ratings of the Goldberg Inventory and the outcome variables were given in a single 
administration, informed observers may have responded positively or negatively across the 
entire survey, not effectively discriminating their scores on the differing scales. 
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Another key finding was that when participants were grouped as either non-deceptors 
(i.e., participants who were not identified by any methods as engaging in other-deception or 
self-deception) or some-deceptors (participants who were identified by one or more of the 
methods as engaging in self-deception and/or other-deception), no significant differences 
were observed between the two groups, suggesting that deception , when defined as a one-
dimensional construct , is not related to differences in adjustment, integrity, interpersonal 
skills, and satisfaction with life.   
While no significant findings were observed when deception was defined as a one-
dimensional construct, several significant differences were observed when defining deception 
in terms of self-deception and other-deception. Specifically, higher ratings on adjustment 
were related to several indicators of other-deception. That is, those individuals who were 
hypothesized to be engaging in other deception were seen as being better adjusted. These 
findings are consistent with some researchers’ views that the ability to present oneself in a 
manner that is appropriate to the demands of the situation is quite functional (as suggested by 
Rosse, Stecher, Miller & Levin, 1998). It may be that those individuals who can adapt their 
personality to meet the demands of a variety of situations, come across to those around them 
as being better adjusted.  
Differences in scores on the GI scale were found to be significantly related to the 
outcome variable of integrity. Specifically, those individuals who had higher ratings on the 
good impression scale were seen as having higher levels of integrity. These findings are  
consistent with previous research by Gough (1996) that suggest that high scorers on the GI 
are often seen in a positive light, as appreciative, cooperative, conscientious, and thorough.   
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.                                     
 
60
 For interpersonal skills, there was some indication that both indicators of self-
deception and other-deception were important predictors of how one’s level of interpersonal 
skills were perceived. It may be that those individuals who engage in other-deception have a 
flexible personality and are able to change their behaviors to align with the needs of a social 
situation, thus leading others to have the perception that they have higher levels of 
interpersonal skills. Those high in self-deception may overlook their own flaws and therefore 
come across as more confident and in turn, as having higher levels of interpersonal skills.  
Several results suggest that individuals who are high in self-deception may be less 
satisfied with their lives than those individuals who are low in self-deception. These findings 
are somewhat consistent with some of the work by Paulhus (1988) which indicates that early 
in relationships with others, individuals who are high in self-deception are initially seen as 
interesting, confident, and well-adjusted. However, with more exposure they are seen as 
arrogant, hostile, and maladjusted, all variables that one would hypothesize to be negatively 
correlated with satisfaction with life.  
Understanding why specific hypotheses can not be tested 
Although it is certainly important to have an understanding of the significant results, 
it is also critical to gain insight into why the participants could not be placed into the 
hypothesized groups.  One contributing factor was that many hypothesized indicators of 
other-deception identified very few participants as engaging in this type of deception.  For 
example, one hypothesized indicator of other-deception was that participants would raise 
their score two points in the “apply for a job” condition in comparison to the “answer 
honestly” condition. However, in the present study, no participants met this criteria and 
overall, the mean change score for the entire group was quite small (M = .06).  Similar results 
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were found for all three social desirability scales hypothesized to be indicators of other-
deception (i.e., GI, IM, FGCPI). That is, given the original constraints, very few participants 
were identified as other-deceptors (i.e., sample sizes ranging from 3-14). Likewise,  few 
participants were identified by the difference scores that were hypothesized to be indicators 
of other-deception ( “apply for a job” – informed other difference score yielding only 3 
participants and the “apply for a job”-role play difference score yielding only 37 
participants). 
 Although limited research has been done in the field to examine the base rates of 
deception, several comparisons can be made between the results of this study and the norm 
groups reported by the authors of the scales. Across the three scales, the rate of participants 
being flagged as engaging in other-deception is quite similar to the norm groups reported by 
the authors. Based on 78 samples of participants, Gough (1996) estimated the range of 
participants surpassing the FGCPI cut-score to be  0% to 8.5%. Based on his normative 
database (n = 3000), only approximately 2%  of people would be expected to surpass the cut-
score of the GI.  For the IM scale of the BIDR, 30% of participants would be expected to 
surpass the threshold level. While the majority of the results in the present  study were 
consistent with findings from the authors’ normative databases, it was anticipated that the 
rate of other-deception would be higher in the present study as the students had some 
motivation to present themselves in a favorable light in the “answer as if you are applying for 
a job” condition. In creating the normative samples, much of the research had focused on 
individuals who may have had limited motivation to portray themselves in a favorable light 
(e.g., members of an inventor’s club). Additionally, these percentages are much lower than 
those found in previous research. For example, one study reports that 42% of job applicants 
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reported giving false opinions (McDaniel, Douglas, & Snell, 1997) and 45% of job applicants 
indicated that they had observed or performed nonexistent tasks (Anderson & Warner, 1984). 
These study results would suggest a much higher number of other-deceptors in the 
population than was found in this study. However, an alternative explanation is that the 
manipulation in the present study (i.e., the “answer as if you are applying for a job”) 
instructions may have been too week to elicit other-deception.  A final explanation may be 
that the rate of other-deception for job applicants may indeed, be quite low and therefore, not 
a pervasive problem.   
Sample sizes varied for identifying self-deceptors. For example, the SDE scale 
identified 81 participants as engaging in self-deception and was consistent with the Paulhus’ 
normative sample (i.e., 30% of his norm group was identified as self-deceptors).  However, 
fewer participants were identified using the difference score approach. For the difference 
score of “answer honestly” – role play only 32 participants were flagged as self-deceptors 
and for “answer honestly” –informed other, only 3 participants were identified.  
Limitations and future research 
 Several limitations were observed in the research. Although the sample size was 
relatively large (i.e., n  = 242), it may have been too small to include an adequate number of 
self- deceptors and other-deceptors. Future research should focus on gaining a better 
understanding of the base rates of self-deceptors and other-deceptors in both the general 
population and applicant population. A better understanding of frequency of occurrence 
would allow for a deeper understanding of whether examining deception is of practical and 
theoretical importance forwarding future research. That is, if the rate of deception is quite 
small, it may be that future studies may not be warranted. 
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  However, other possible causes of the small sample sizes should be investigated. An 
alternative explanation is that participants in this study did not have an adequate level of 
motivation to engage in other-deception. Although participants were given instructions to 
respond as if they were applying for a job, in reality, they may have had very little motivation 
to consciously portray themselves in a positive light. That is, they were aware that there were 
no tangible rewards for presenting a profile that was socially desirable and as a result, may 
have had little motivation to present a positive personality profile.  Future researchers could 
replicate this study in the lab but take actions that may raise the level of motivation (e.g., 
offer a cash prize). This study could also be replicated in the field, where motivation is likely 
much higher, given that often whether an individual does or does not receive a job is at least 
partially contingent upon their responses to a personality profile.     
 Another possibility in this study is that the manipulation (i.e., the instructions) may 
not have been too weak to elicit other-deception in the present study. In an effort to avoid 
demand effects, the instructions in this research stayed at a very general level, informing 
participants that this personality survey was just one part of the selection process. As a result, 
they may have put an inadequate level of emphasis on the importance of this step in the 
process or felt motivated to portray themselves positively in order to receive a job offer. 
Future research should consider creating stronger instructions, those that emphasize the 
importance of the personality test in the selection process and/or emphasize that the 
participant is very interested in the job in question.  
The present study was an improvement over prior research as it included a role play 
as an additional method of detecting deception. However, the role play used in this study had 
several limitations. Although the simulation was designed to engage individuals in 
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approximately 30 minutes of dialogue, the interactions actually lasted only approximately 10 
minutes. If researchers could design role plays that lasted for longer periods of time, more 
behavioral observations could be made and perhaps, more valid ratings of personality. In an 
ideal setting, participants would be observed by multiple trained raters in multiple role plays.  
This research added to the literature base by providing some insight into several 
different implications of both self-deception and other-deception. However, there was some 
evidence to suggest that the results may have been obscured by a methods effect. In future 
research, informed observers should be given adequate education regarding how to provide 
effective and valid ratings of others. Additionally, it may be important to gather data from 
multiple informed observers and perhaps not have the same individuals who rate outcome 
variables also rate personality.  
 This study also focused heavily on the use of difference scores. Several criticisms of 
difference scores have been made in the literature and may not be an effective means of 
measuring congruence. In a summary of the literature, Edwards (1993) provides his 
interpretations of  the some of the most worrisome problems when using difference scores 
including: reduced reliability, ambiguous interpretation, confounded effects, and untested 
constraints. In the future, researchers should consider using different methods of measuring 
congruence.  
 In an effort to understand the roles of social desirability scales in detecting deception, 
the present study simultaneously examined multiple scales.  However, one of the most 
pressing areas for future research lies in gaining an understanding of many more of the most 
commonly-used scales. Currently, many organizations use this tool as a method for screening 
“fakers” and as such, may drop people from an applicant pool solely based upon their 
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responses to this scale. Practitioners need to have a better understanding of what the scales 
are truly capturing before using this as a decision-making tool. While the current research 
relies on the BIDR, fake good scale, and good impression scales, future research should 
examine what other commonly used scales are capturing. It may be that some of these scales 
are not able to adequately differentiate between the different types of deception or perhaps 
some are capturing self-deception while others may be capturing other-deception. A deeper 
understanding of what the scales are measuring may also shed some light on the meaning of 
the much-disputed covariation between personality scales and social desirability scales (e.g., 
Holden & Fekken, 1989; Nicholson & Hogan, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1983, Smith & 
Ellingson, 2002). 
Another area for future research lies in examining the outcomes associated with each 
type of deceptor. Although the present study examined four potential outcomes, there are 
multiple other areas to examine. One of the most critical areas, is an understanding of the 
relationship between type of deceptor and overall job performance. As this link is researched 
and hopefully becomes clear, it is a good first start in understanding the role that this 
information should play in the selection process.  
Another limitation is that the current study does not take into account levels of 
deception. That is, once individuals reach a specific threshold, they will be treated equally to 
others who have surpassed the said threshold. That is, there are no provisions to measure 
level of faking. Research suggests that this may be an important consideration. For example, 
one researcher suggests that the amount of self-deception one is engaging is an important 
consideration in determining outcomes (Baumeister, 1989).   He suggests that there is an 
optimal level of illusion (in his definition of illusion he includes one’s perception of the self 
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as well as one’s perception of the world), a level of illusion at which people are happiest and 
function most effectively. However, deviating from this optimal level of illusion is likely to 
cause problems. Future research should examine the role that differing levels of deception 
have for those individuals that are identified as self-deceptors, other-deceptors, or mixed-
deceptors and ascertain the impact that it may have on outcomes.  
Future research should also consider additional methods of assessing personality 
(e.g., continue studying assessment centers, how to use interviews to assess personality) as 
people will continually be attempting to find ways to “outsmart” paper and pencil tests. As 
Ehrenreich (2001) suggests, some approaches are quite simplistic: 
My approach to pre-employment personality tests has been zero tolerance vis-à-vis 
the obvious "crimes"--drug use and theft--but to leave a little wriggle room elsewhere, 
just so it doesn't look like I'm faking out the test. My approach was wrong. When 
presenting yourself as a potential employee, you can never be too much of a suck-up 
(p. 124). 
 
other approaches are more sophisticated. That is, there are currently books on the market 
written by individuals with a technical understanding of personality inventories and use their 
educational and professional backgrounds to “coach” others into “beating” the test. As more 
individuals become involved in this “trade”, it will become necessary to produce more 
sophisticated tests as well as use other avenues as a means of collecting personality 
information about others.  
Despite the limitations of the current study, it is an initial start in gaining some insight 
into the reasons why individuals present (or do not present) accurate portrayals of the self. 
Furthermore, it examines how some traditionally used methods of examining “faking” can  
capture these different types of deception. The present research also identifies potential 
implications for organizations hiring these individuals. It is hoped that the present study will 
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make other researchers and the applied world take a more critical eye toward their approach 
to measuring and assessing deception.  
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Appendix A 
Goldberg Scales 
Please rate the (participant/yourself) on each item using the following scale:  
 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not    Neutral    Very  
true          true of participant 
     of participant  
01.  ___ Extraverted 
02.  ___ Talkative 
03.  ___ Assertive 
04.  ___ Verbal 
05.  ___ Energetic 
06.  ___ Bold 
07.  ___ Active 
08.  ___ Daring 
09.  ___ Vigorous 
10.  ___ Unrestrained 
11.  ___ Introverted 
12.  ___ Shy 
13.  ___ Quiet 
14.  ___ Reserved 
15.  ___ Untalkative 
16.  ___ Inhibited 
17.  ___ Withdrawn 
18.  ___ Timid 
19.  ___ Bashful 
20.  ___ Unadventorous  
21.  ___ Kind 
22.  ___Cooperative 
23.  ___Sympathetic 
24.  ___Warm 
25.  ___Trustful 
26.  ___Considerate 
27.  ___ Pleasant 
28.  ___ Agreeable 
29. ____Helpful 
30. ____Generous 
31. ____Cold 
32. ____Unkind 
33. ____Unsympathetic 
34. ____ Distrustful 
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.                                     
 
83
35. ____ Harsh 
36. ____ Demanding 
37. ____ Rude 
38. ____ Selfish 
39. ____ Uncooperative 
40. ____ Uncharitable 
*Items 1-20 assess extraversion. Items 21-40 assess agreeableness. 
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Appendix B 
Fake Good Scale 
Formula for fake good scale = 41.255 + .273 (Dominance) + .198 (Empathy) +.538 
(Good Impression)- .255 (Well-being) -.168 (Flexibility) 
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Appendix C 
 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-Version 6  
 
Use the scale below to indicate how true each item is of you.  
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not            Very  
true    Neutral       true  
 
01. ___ My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
02.* ___ It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
03. ___ I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
04.* ___ I have not always been honest with myself. 
05. ___ I always know why I like things. 
06.* ___When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
07. ___ Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
08.* ___ I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
09. ___ I am fully in control of my own fate. 
10.* ___ It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
11. ___ I never regret my decisions. 
12.* ___ I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
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13. ___ The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
14.* ___ My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
15. ___ I am a completely rational person. 
16.* ___ I rarely appreciate criticism. 
17. ___ I am very confident of my judgments. 
18.* ___ I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
19. ___ It’s alright with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
20.* ___ I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do.  
21.* ___ I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
22. ___ I never cover up my mistakes. 
23.* ___ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
24. ___ I never swear. 
25.* ___ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
26. ___ I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
27.* ___ I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
28. ___ When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
29.* ___ I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
30. ___ I always declare everything at customs. 
31.* ___ When I was young, I sometimes stole things. 
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32. ___ I have never dropped litter on the street. 
33.* ___ I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
34. ___ I never read sexy books or magazines. 
35.* ___ I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
36. ___ I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
37.* ___ I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. 
38. ___ I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
39.* ___ I have some pretty awful habits. 
40. ___ I don’t gossip about other people’s business.   
* Indicates items that will be reverse-scored. 
** Items 1-20 assess SDE. Items 21-40 assess IM. 
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Appendix D 
Adjustment scale 
Please rate the participant on each of the items using the following scale:  
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not    Neutral    Very  
      true          true of participant 
of participant  
 
1. ___ The participant is well-adjusted. 
2. ___ The participant is happy.  
3. ___ The participant likes himself/herself. 
4.       ___ The participant is mentally healthy.   
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Appendix E 
  
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) 
 
Please rate the participant on each of the items using the following scale:  
 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not    Neutral    Very  
true          true of participant 
of participant  
 
 
1. ___ In most ways the participants sees life as close to ideal 
2. ___ The participant perceives that conditions of life are excellent. 
3. ___ The participant is satisfied with life. 
4. ___ So far, the participant has gotten the important things wanted in life. 
5.       ___ If the participant could live life over he/she would change almost nothing. 
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Appendix F 
Interpersonal Competency Scale  
Please rate the participant on each of the items using the following scale:  
 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not    Neutral    Very  
true          true of participant 
of participant  
1. ___ The participant has a reputation for being able to cope with difficult people. 
2. ___ The participant finds it easy to talk with all kinds of people. 
3. ___ The participant finds it easy to play many roles (e.g., student, leader, 
follower, church-goer, athlete, traveler, etc.).                                                                                         
 
4. ___ The participant would be good at playing charades. 
5. ___ People seek the participant out to tell him/her their troubles. 
6. ___ The participant has unusual skills for making groups, clubs, or organizations 
function effectively. 
 
7. ___ The participant has unusual skills for assessing the motivation of other 
people. 
 
8. ___ If the participant wants to, he/she can be a very persuasive person. 
9. ___ The participant has a clear picture of what he/she is like as a person. 
10. ___ The participant knows what he/she wants to do with life. 
11. ___ The participant is shrewd and insightful about other people. 
12. ___ The participant would enjoy being an actor/actress. 
13. ___ Most of the time, the participant has an optimistic outlook. 
14. ___ The participant has good practical judgment. 
15. ___ Others believe the participant has good practical judgment.  
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Appendix G 
Integrity Scale 
Please rate the participant on each of the items using the following scale:  
 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6--------------7 
Not    Neutral    Very  
true          true of participant 
of participant  
 
1. ___ The participant is an honest individual. 
2. ___ The participant does not lie. 
3. ___ The participant does not take things that do not belong to him/her. 
4.  ___ The participant is trustworthy.  
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.                                     
 
92
Appendix H 
Role play information 
Scenario 
 
To be read to participants: 
 
During this simulation you will assume that you work for a fictitious company that provides 
cell phone products and services. The background information provides you with information 
on the organization, your role in the organization, and the products and services you 
represent.  
 
As you take on the role outlined in this simulations, you will be most effective if you handle 
the situation the way YOU think is best.  
  
Background information on Reliable Communications (to be distributed to 
participants): 
 
Founded in 1957 by a group of Marketing experts, “Reliable Communications, Inc. is a 
rapidly growing organization in the telecommunications industry. Reliable Communications 
success can be traced to a strong commitment to providing quality service at a low cost. 
Reliable Communications has communicated internally and externally its commitment to 
unparalleled customer service and satisfaction. It has invested heavily in internal customer 
service training and other initiatives related to providing the best possible customer service.  
 
Your role: 
• You were recently hired as a Customer Service Specialist in the Reliable 
Communications’ Webster Grove store 
• Your boss is the store manager, Bob Smith. He has let you know that customer 
service is key and he gives you a lot of leeway in determining the best way to satisfy 
customers. He has let you know that offering “perks” to disgruntled customers is 
okay. He lets you decide what those are but says you must have solid rationale in 
defense of your decisions.  
• You are responsible for selling cell phone products and services to customers who 
visit the Webster Grove store. Additionally, you are responsible for handling a variety 
of customer complaints on matters ranging from billing problems to poor service 
connections.  
• Your only other peer is Jason Wilson and he is currently gone on vacation in Tahiti 
and can not be reached for the next 3 weeks. 
• Your boss is out sick for the day and you are the only person in the store.  
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Information on Reliable Communications Cell phone products and Services 
 
Reliable Communications provides 1 and 2 year service contracts. All customers who receive 
new service contracts receive a free phone (currently, Reliable Communications carries only 
one type of cell phone).  
 
The table below describes the monthly plans available and the cost of additional services. 
 
 
Type of 
plan 
(all plans 
include 
free 
standard 
phone) 
Monthly 
Cost 
Anytime 
Minutes 
(all 
minutes 
are 
anytime) 
Cost per 
month to 
add 
Voicemail 
Cost per 
month 
add 3-
way 
calling 
Cost  per 
month 
add call 
waiting 
# of 
Free 
months  
with 1 
year 
service 
( 
# of 
Free 
months 
with 2 
year 
service 
Standard 39.99 80 2.50 1.00 1.50 1 2 
Enhanced 49.99 120 1.50 1.00 1.50 1 2 
Premium 69.99 500 1.00 .50 .50 1 2 
Extra 
Premium 
109.99 3000 Included Included Included 2 3 
 
 
Products offered:  
 
Product Price 
Hands free headset 39.99 
Phone cover 15.00 
Car Charger 42.00 
Spare Battery 25.00 
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Scenario (to be given to the trained rater) 
 
You will play the role of Chris Hoff, a physician at the local hospital. As a physician, your 
cell phone is very important to you. You must be able to stay in constant contact with the 
hospital in case of an emergency. Your boss has insisted that you use Reliable 
Communications for this business cell phone as they are good providers.  
 
Characteristics that describe Chris Hoff 
• Mildly impatient and insistent on good customer service 
• Extremely busy and overwhelmed with stressful work 
• Generally reasonable if treated in a respectful manner 
• Very skeptical about Reliable Communications. You didn’t want to use them in the 
first place, but your boss told them you had to use them for you work cell phone 
purchase. Now that you have experienced problems with them, you are even more 
convinced that there is no value in using the products. 
 
Reason for your visit to the store: 
• For the last two months in a row, you were invoiced for three way calling which 
you did not sign up for 
• You had signed up for voicemail but it is not yet set up 
• You also did not receive the one month free service the salesperson offered you 
when you signed your contract 
 
Tone for the simulation: 
• Irritated 
• Looking for answers and solutions to the invoice problem 
• Looking for assurance that future problems won’t come up in the future 
• Interaction should start out mildly tense but become less/more so dependent on the 
participant’s interactions with you  
 
Interaction guide 
If Lee Says: Then Chris responds: 
Lee opens by asking Chris to share his/her problem. The problem? The problem is that your 
company has been ripping me off. I’m getting 
charged for a Voice Mail feature that I don’t 
have. When the sales person talked to me, I 
signed a contract stating that the feature would 
be added. Also, I’m having problems with 
getting my free month of service that I was 
offered.   
Lee opens the conversation by attempting to ask for 
more information (e.g, copy of the invoice, name, 
etc.) 
I can give you this information, but I really 
want to know what you are going to do to help 
me.  
Lee asks who your salesperson was  I think it was Jason. However, I want to make 
sure that you can help me today.   
Lee asks you to calm down without offering any Why should I? You would be as upset as I am if 
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kind of resolution to your problems. you have all of these problems. You are already 
charging me an arm and a leg for this service 
and you are still trying to take me for a ride. I 
get pushed around all the time by your people 
to buy more products.  
Lee says it must have been a mistake. This isn’t the first time I’ve had problems with 
this company. . I used this company for my 
personal cell phone and ended up getting 
charged 3 times in one month! Plain and 
simple, I need some answers and help or I’ll be 
forced to cancel my contract. 
Lee says he/she doesn’t know why you were 
incorrectly invoiced, but that he/she can take care of 
the situation.  
I need this taken care of today. What can you 
do for me? 
Lee tries to defer the problem to someone else Isn’t there anything you can do for me now? 
This has been a big hassle for me.  
If Lee can’t make any progress: If you can’t help me, please find someone who 
can. 
Lee claims he/she can’t verify your information 
because he/she does not have computer access: 
That sounds like an excuse to me. Here’s my 
copy of my invoice.  
Lee apologizes, takes ownership of the problem, 
acknowledges you are correct, agrees the mistakes 
have been unacceptable, expresses empathy for 
your situation, and outlines clear action steps 
If Chris feels that it is genuine, he she starts to 
settle down and become less skeptical. (e.g., I 
appreciate that you are trying to help me)  
Lee offers credit.  Well yes, I would expect your to but how can 
you assure me that this won’t happen again.  
Lee asks Chris what solution he/she is looking for.  Chris provides a solution that is relatively easy 
for Lee (e.g., free service for a month, free 
products, credit on her account) 
Lee offers solutions without asking Chris what 
he/she wants 
Chris becomes irritated and resistant to Lee’s 
suggestions 
Lee offers to talk to the appropriate people to make 
sure it won’t happen again 
That’s good, but I’d like some compensation for 
the trouble you’ve cause us. What are you 
going to offer me 
Lee recaps the action items and the timeframes 
(without being prompted) 
Chris becomes docile and the tension is all but 
gone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  
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Descriptive Statistics for all Participants 
 
Measures   N Mean SD Reliability 
Goldberg Inventory      
 Self-Answer Honestly 242  5.39  0.61  0.91 
 Self-Apply For Job 242  5.46  0.63  0.92 
 Roleplay 242  4.52  0.97  0.97 
 Informed Other 242  5.57  0.64  0.91 
CPI Scales      
 Good Impression 239  23.81  6.61  0.87 
 Fake Good Scale 226  56.14  4.05  n/a 
BIDR      
 Self-deceptive Enhancement 242  4.56   0.60  0.68 
 Impression Management 242  4.13  0.89  0.85 
Outcome Measures      
 Adjustment 240  5.87  0.89  0.84 
 Integrity 240  6.28  0.88  0.82 
 Interpersonal skills 240  5.13  0.80  0.84 
 Satisfaction w/ Life 240  4.78  1.05  0.79 
Goldberg Inventory-difference scores      
 
Apply for job-answer 
honestly 242  0.06  0.43  n/a 
 Apply for job-role play 242  0.93  1.01  n/a 
 Apply for job-informed other 242  -0.11  0.90  n/a 
 Answer honestly-role play 242  0.87  1.02  n/a 
  Answer honestly-inf. Other 242  -0.18  0.87  n/a 
 
 
 
Starke, Mary, 2006, UMSL, p.           
 
97
Table 2 
 
Pearson Correlations for all Participants 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.  Goldberg–self answer honestly                 
2.  Goldberg-self-apply for job .75**                
3.  Goldberg-role play .22** .27**               
4.  Goldberg-informed other .04 .01 -.15*              
5.  Good Impression scale -.11 -.01 -.08 .07             
6.  Fake Good scale -.04 .04 -.13 .14* .89**            
7.  SDE scale .25** .35** -.06 -.11 .10 .15*           
8.  Impression management scale .07 .22** -.06 -.07 .07 .12 .54**          
9.  Adjustment -.08 -.13* -.04 .56** .10 .06 -.12 -.05         
10. Integrity .00 -.07 -.06 .27** .15* .09 -.09 -.02 .25**        
11. Interpersonal Skills .07 .00 -.05 .74** .13* .18** -.03 .00 .58** .25**       
12. Satisfaction With Life -.06 -.10 -.12 .42** .00 .02 -.10 -.04 .62** .21** .45**      
13. Apply for Job-Answer Honestly -.30** .41** .08 -.05 .14* .12 .17** .22** -.08 -.09 -.09 -.06     
14. Apply for Job-Role Play .26** .38** -.80** .14* .07 .15* .28** .20** -.04 .01 .05 .05 .18*    
15. Apply for Job-Informed Other .50** .70** .29** -.71** -.06 -.07 .33** .21** -.49** -.24** -.53** -.37** .32 .16*   
16. Answer Honestly-Role Play .39** .20** -.82** .16* .01 .01 .20** .10 -.01 .05 .09 
